Washington and Lee Law Review
Volume 75

Issue 2

Article 8

4-1-2018

The Diminishing Duty of Loyalty
Julian Velasco
Notre Dame Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr
Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Julian Velasco, The Diminishing Duty of Loyalty, 75 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1035 (2018).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr/vol75/iss2/8
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington and Lee Law Review at Washington and
Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington and Lee Law
Review by an authorized editor of Washington and Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. For more
information, please contact christensena@wlu.edu.

The Diminishing Duty of Loyalty
Julian Velasco*
Abstract
Fiduciary duties comprise an integral part of corporate law. It
is generally understood that directors owe the corporation and its
shareholders two fiduciary duties: the duty of care and the duty of
loyalty. Although both duties are firmly established in corporate
law, they are not treated equally. It is generally understood that the
duty of loyalty is enforced far more rigorously than the duty of care.
The justification for this dichotomy is twofold. First, differential
treatment is appropriate because of the relative urgencies of the
underlying subject matter: loyalty issues pose greater risks than do
care issues. Second, the deference of the business judgment rule is
made possible by the rigor of the entire fairness test: directors who
are not conflicted can be trusted. In this Article, I demonstrate that
the duty of loyalty is not enforced as rigorously as is commonly
believed. Over fifty years ago, Professor Harold Marsh argued that
the duty of loyalty had been watered down substantially over the
preceding century. I argue that the diminishment of the duty of
loyalty has continued and increased substantially since the time of
his writing. I catalog various legal developments that have had the
effect of curtailing the enforcement of the duty of loyalty
significantly. As a result of these developments, I maintain that the
corporate law reality does not currently match the corporate law
theory. I argue that some sort of realignment is necessary: either the
law must be amended to correspond to the theory, or the theory must
be revised to reflect reality.

* Associate Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School. J.D., 1994,
Columbia University; B.S., 1991, Georgetown University. I would like to thank
the participants of the 2017 Fiduciary Law Workshop for their helpful comments
and suggestions, and Priyank Doshi, Liam Gallagher, and Andrew Meerwarth for
their research assistance.
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I. Introduction
Fiduciary duties comprise an integral part of corporate law:
One of the fundamental tenets of Delaware corporate law
provides for a separation of control and ownership. The board of
directors has the legal responsibility to manage the business of
a corporation for the benefit of its shareholder owners.
Accordingly, fiduciary duties are imposed on the directors of
Delaware corporations to regulate their conduct when they
discharge that function.1

It is generally understood that directors owe the corporation and
its shareholders two fiduciary duties: the duty of care and the duty

1.

Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 9 (Del. 1998).
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of loyalty.2 The duty of care requires diligence.3 Directors are
expected to do a good job in managing the company. They breach
this duty when they are negligent (or grossly negligent).4 The duty
of loyalty is concerned with conflicts of interest. Directors are
expected to act in the interests of the corporation and its
shareholders, rather than in their own interests. They breach this
duty, inter alia, when they engage in unfair self-dealing.5
Although both duties are firmly established in corporate law,
they are not treated equally. As corporate law scholars and jurists
know, the duty of loyalty is enforced far more rigorously than the
duty of care. The justification for this dichotomy is twofold. First,
differential treatment is appropriate because of the relative
urgencies of the underlying subject matter: loyalty issues pose
greater risks than do care issues.6 Second, the deference of the
business judgment rule is made possible by the rigor of the entire
fairness test: directors who are not conflicted can be trusted.7
2. See Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370
(Del. 2006) (rejecting good faith as “an independent fiduciary duty that stands on
the same footing as the duties of care and loyalty”). But see generally Julian
Velasco, How Many Fiduciary Duties Are There in Corporate Law?, 83 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1231 (2010) (arguing that the titular question is misleading and irrelevant,
but that the best answer is that there are five duties).
3. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (“[D]irectors have a
duty to inform themselves, prior to making a business decision, of all material
information reasonably available to them. Having become so informed, they must
then act with the requisite care in the discharge of their duties.”).
4. See id. (“[U]nder the business judgment rule director liability is
predicated upon concepts of gross negligence.”).
5. See Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971) (“[T]he
intrinsic fairness standard . . . will be applied only when the fiduciary duty is
accompanied by self-dealing.”).
6. See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW 141–42 (2d ed. 2009)
(arguing that the implications presented by duty of loyalty matters are more
significant than duty of care implications).
7. See Julian Velasco, Structural Bias and the Need for Substantive Review,
82 WASH. U. L.Q. 821, 827, 834–35 (2004) (“The deference of the business
judgment rule is justifiable only because of, and also makes possible, the rigor of
the entire fairness test. The legitimacy of either depends upon the other.”); infra
Part II.B (explaining the complementarity of enforcement of the duties of care
and loyalty); infra notes 70–73, 96–99, 304 and accompanying text (same); cf.
FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAW 341 (2d ed. 2010)
The idea that directors, with their expertise, are more likely to reach a
better business decision than the courts presupposes a situation in
which we can trust the directors to act in the best interest of the
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In a previous article, I attempted to provide a comprehensive
defense of the duty of care.8 I argued that “the duty of care is not
simply an ill-fitting appendage to the duty of loyalty, but rather an
essential aspect of the singular fiduciary concept that also
encompasses the duty of loyalty.”9 Properly understood, fiduciary
law principles demand that the fiduciary “act in the interests of
the beneficiary in all relevant respects.”10 Although I
acknowledged
that
a
cost-benefit
analysis
supports
under-enforcement of care issues, I argued that the appropriate
level of enforcement is unlikely to be zero.11
In this Article, I will develop a complementary theme that was
introduced in my previous work. I will argue that the duty of
loyalty is not enforced as rigorously as is commonly believed. As a
result, the corporate law reality does not currently match the
corporate law theory. This is important because the deference of
the business judgment rule with respect to care issues is often
justified, at least in part, by reference to the rigor of the entire
fairness test with respect to loyalty issues.12 If this justification
fails, then some sort of realignment seems necessary.
My argument will proceed as follows. In Part II, I will set forth
the common wisdom on the duty of loyalty. I will start by
discussing the claim, advanced by Professor Harold Marsh, Jr.
over fifty years ago, that the duty of loyalty had been watered down
substantially over the preceding century.13 Although the argument
has received general acceptance, it has not fundamentally

corporation. After all, what advantage is expertise if we cannot trust
the directors to use their expertise in the company’s best interest?
Needless to say, when the directors have a personal financial interest
in conflict with the corporation’s, there is a reason not to trust the
directors.
8. See generally Julian Velasco, A Defense of the Corporate Law Duty of
Care, 40 J. CORP. L. 647 (2015).
9. Id. at 648.
10. Id.
11. See id. at 661 (“[T]here are reasons to believe that a cost-benefit analysis
would not support eliminating the duty of care.”).
12. See generally supra note 7 and accompanying text.
13. See generally Harold Marsh, Jr., Are Directors Trustees?: Conflict of
Interest and Corporate Morality, 22 BUS. LAW. 35 (1966) (exploring the history of
the enforcement of the duty of loyalty).
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undermined confidence in the duty of loyalty.14 I will then set forth
the prevailing corporate law narrative: that the duty of loyalty is
enforced by means of rigorous judicial review under the entire
fairness test.15
Part III is the heart of this Article. In this Part, I will
demonstrate that the diminishment of the duty of loyalty that was
observed by Marsh has continued and increased substantially
since the time of his writing.16 I will elaborate on various legal
developments that have had the effect of curtailing enforcement of
the duty of loyalty. In Part IV, I will consider other legal
developments that seemed to offer hope as mitigating forces.17
However, I will show that ultimately they did not live up to their
promise. The goal of these two Parts is to show that, contrary to
popular belief, enforcement of the duty of loyalty is quite lax. This
raises the question of whether shareholders may be
under-protected from conflicts of interest of management.
In Part V, I will consider the implications of this realization. I
will argue that there are three possible responses for the law to
take.18 The first approach would be to recognize the problem and
scale back on the developments that have diminished the
enforcement of the duty of loyalty. I will briefly consider a few
avenues for doing so. The second approach would be to leave recent
developments alone, but to devise alternative strategies to
mitigate the negative effects of the diminished duty of loyalty.
Again, I will briefly consider a few possibilities. The third approach
would be to do nothing. It may be that all of the developments are
entirely justified, and the diminishment of the duty of loyalty is
wholly appropriate. Nevertheless, I will argue that, if this is the
case, we should embrace this truth explicitly, and revise the
misleading corporate law narrative that seems to demand a
rigorous duty of loyalty. The status quo is not in keeping with the
corporate law narrative; one or the other must yield.

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Infra Part II.A.
Infra Part II.B.
Infra Part III.
Infra Part IV.
Infra Part V.
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II. Common Wisdom

The duty of loyalty lies at the very heart of fiduciary law. “[T]o
prohibit fiduciaries from misappropriating or misusing entrusted
property or power . . . the duty of loyalty is manifested by
important preventative rules.”19 One such rule is the “no conflicts”
rule. A classic formulation can be found in the case of Guth v. Loft,
Inc.20:
The rule that requires an undivided and unselfish loyalty to the
corporation demands that there shall be no conflict between
duty and self-interest. . . . The rule, inveterate and
uncompromising in its rigidity, does not rest upon the narrow
ground of injury or damage to the corporation resulting from a
betrayal of confidence, but upon a broader foundation of a wise
public policy that, for the purpose of removing all temptation,
extinguishes all possibility of profit flowing from a breach of the
confidence imposed by the fiduciary relation.21

And yet, corporate law has taken a more lenient approach towards
conflicts of interest. Conflicted transactions are not strictly
prohibited; instead, they are regulated. The first section below
focuses on Marsh’s seminal article, which documented corporate
law’s move from the strict fiduciary rule to a more permissive
stance.22 The second section sets forth the prevailing corporate law
narrative on the duty of loyalty: that, despite these changes
identified by Marsh, corporate law maintains a robust enforcement
of the duty of loyalty through careful judicial scrutiny under the
entire fairness test.23
A. Marsh’s Claim
The starting point for any discussion of a diminishing duty of
loyalty in corporate law is the seminal article written by Marsh
half a century ago.24 Marsh argued that the courts had watered
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

TAMAR FRANKEL, FIDUCIARY LAW 108 (2011).
5 A.2d 503 (Del. 1939).
Id. at 510.
Infra Part II.A.
Infra Part II.B.
See generally Marsh, supra note 13.
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down the protections of the duty of loyalty over time. In particular,
he identified three time periods that demonstrate this downward
trajectory:
In 1880 it could have been stated with confidence that in the
United States the general rule was that any contract between a
director and his corporation was voidable at the instance of the
corporation or its shareholders, without regard to the fairness
or unfairness of the transaction.
....
It could have been stated with reasonable confidence in 1910
that the general rule was that a contract between a director and
his corporation was valid if it was approved by a disinterested
majority of his fellow directors and was not found to be unfair
or fraudulent by the court if challenged; but that a contract in
which a majority of the board was interested was voidable at
the instance of the corporation or its shareholders without
regard to any question of fairness.
....
By 1960 it could be said with some assurance that the general
rule was that no transaction of a corporation with any or all of
its directors was automatically voidable at the suit of a
shareholder, whether there was a disinterested majority of the
board or not; but that the courts would review such a contract
and subject it to rigid and careful scrutiny, and would invalidate
the contract if it was found to be unfair to the corporation.25

This account has gained general acceptance among legal
scholars. It describes a very clear move from a flat prohibition
against conflict of interest transactions to their regulation.
Whether this move was a positive development or a negative one
may be open to debate, but the fact that it represents a weakening
of the rigor of the duty of loyalty is not.
In fact, Marsh clearly viewed this as a negative development.
He argued that the change occurred abruptly, and without

25. Marsh, supra note 13, at 36, 39–40, 43; see 2 MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN.
§§ 8.60–8.63 introductory cmt. at 8-493 (4th ed. 2011 rev.) (discussing the
development of the rule against conflicts).
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reasoned explanation by the courts.26 There is an implicit
suggestion that the development was somewhat illegitimate.27
Although they seem to have gained general acceptance,
Marsh’s claims have not gone entirely unchallenged. For example,
Norwood Beveridge has argued that Marsh’s account was
“completely erroneous.”28 Beveridge argued that “interested
director contracts were never thought to be voidable without
regard to fairness.”29 Rather, the law “categorically
prohibit[ed] . . . the fiduciary from standing on both sides of the
transaction.”30 He claims that “the consent of an informed board
would [always] suffice” to validate the transaction.31 However,
Beveridge’s claims have not gained much traction. For example,
Professor Melvin Eisenberg reviewed the evidence and disagreed
with Beveridge: “Beveridge makes an important contribution in
pointing to [certain] authorities. However, a clear majority of the
early cases support Marsh.”32
David Kershaw has offered a much more interesting and
nuanced critique of Marsh’s thesis.33 He argues that “the path of
U.S. self-dealing law from voidability to fairness is not illogical and
unexplained . . . . [T]he path to fairness is consistent with the early
19th-century fiduciary law and the options made available by the
U.S. conception of the corporation.”34 Kershaw’s disagreement with
Marsh is not about Marsh’s account of the law itself. Rather,
Kershaw takes issue with Marsh’s assessment of the development
26. See Marsh, supra note 13, at 40–41, 43–44, 53 (“One searches in vain in
the decided cases for a reasoned defense of this change in legal philosophy . . . .”).
27. See id. at 40 (“Did the courts discover . . . that greed was no longer a
factor in human conduct? If so, they did not share the basis of this discovery with
the public; nor did they humbly admit their error when confronted with the next
wave of corporate frauds . . . .”).
28. Norwood P. Beveridge, Jr., The Corporate Director’s Fiduciary Duty of
Loyalty: Understanding the Self-Interested Transaction, 41 DEPAUL L. REV. 655,
659 (1992).
29. Id. at 660.
30. Id. at 661.
31. Id.
32. WILLIAM L. CARY & MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
CORPORATIONS 651 (7th ed. unabr. 1995). This is an earlier version of his casebook.
Subsequent versions have not even included a discussion of Beveridge’s theory.
33. See generally David Kershaw, The Path of Corporate Fiduciary Law, 8
N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 395 (2012).
34. Id. at 405.
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of the law—in particular, the claim that the move from voidability
to fairness review was unexplained.35 Kershaw insists that the
seeds of fairness review already existed in fiduciary law and would
eventually come to displace voidability.36
Kershaw used various examples to illustrate his point. With
respect to New Jersey law, Kershaw acknowledges that there was
a strict rule against conflicted transactions.37 However, the remedy
of voidability was limited to unexecuted contracts; for executed
contracts, directors were entitled to fair compensation.38 According
to Kershaw, “[t]he shift to a substantive fairness standard merely
requires the recognition that, from a liability perspective, there is
no difference between a strict rule coupled with a remedial fairness
standard and a substantive fairness standard.”39 With respect to
New York law, Kershaw argues that a shift in perception of a
conflicted transaction from involving merely two parties—the
conflicted director and the shareholders—to involving three—
adding the board, which may not be conflicted—opened the door to
the change in law:
Following the structure of 19th-century fiduciary law, if the
transaction involves the exercise of power [by a fiduciary], then
it is subject to the strict structural loyalty-based approach that
prohibits such transactions, regardless of actual loyalty, and
renders them voidable at the corporation’s or its shareholders’
election. If the transaction involves influence [of a fiduciary],
then the standard is one of fairness.40

Thus, argues Kershaw, the development of the law from strict
voidability to fairness review was not inexplicable.41
35. See id. (“[T]he path of U.S. self-dealing law from voidability to fairness
is not illogical and unexplained . . . .”).
36. See id. (“[T]he path to fairness is consistent with the early 19th-century
fiduciary law and the options made available by the U.S. conception of the
corporation.”).
37. See id. at 445–47 (discussing prohibition of conflicted transactions in
Stewart v. Lehigh Valley R.R. Co., 38 N.J.L. 505 (1875)).
38. See id. at 448–50 (discussing remedies under Gardner v. Butler, 30 N.J.
Eq. 702 (1879)).
39. Id. at 451–52.
40. Id. at 464.
41. See id. at 405 (“[T]he path of U.S. self-dealing law from voidability to
fairness is not illogical and unexplained . . . . On the contrary, the path to fairness
is consistent with early 19th-century fiduciary law and the options made available
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It is important to note that Kershaw does not argue that the
law did not change. To the contrary, Kershaw acknowledges that
the “initial step in U.S. regulation of self-dealing appears wholly
consistent with the first stage of Marsh’s account of the
development of this area of the law.”42 Kershaw merely seeks to
explain what Marsh had claimed was inexplicable and
unprincipled.43
It is equally important to note that Kershaw does not claim
that the changes were inevitable. The forces he discusses merely
“created an opening”44 for the change that occurred. But, things
could have developed otherwise. For example, Kershaw suggests
that the shift from a strict rule to remedial fairness to a rule of
substantive fairness “[a]rguably, . . . amounted merely to a
functional tidying-up of the case law.”45 However, the law could
have developed in the opposite direction: once it was realized that
remedial fairness undercuts the voidability rule, the courts could
have embraced voidability and abandoned remedial fairness
rather than embrace fairness and abandon voidability. This option
would have strengthened the rigor of the duty of loyalty; instead,
courts chose the option that weakened it. Likewise, the
power/influence dichotomy may explain the introduction of the
fairness test into the mix. However, it cannot explain the
abandonment of voidability.
Ultimately, then, the law developed in a way that diminished
the vigor of the duty of loyalty even though this was not necessary
or inevitable. Thus, Marsh’s essential claim is correct. Kershaw
establishes that legal developments are not entirely inexplicable,
but he does not deny that they occurred.
One might have expected that Marsh’s claim would
undermine the role of the duty of loyalty in corporate law theory.
It did not. A strong duty of loyalty remains central. The corporate
narrative merely adjusted to reflect the new reality: rather than
emphasizing strict prohibition of conflicts, the focus changed to
by the U.S. conception of the corporation.”).
42. Id. at 441.
43. See id. at 478 (noting that “the . . . shift in . . . case law, which Marsh
rightly identified . . . is not unexplained in common law evolutionary terms,” even
if it “is unexplained, indeed inexplicable, in policy terms”).
44. Id. at 469.
45. Id. at 456.
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finding acceptable alternatives, including searching judicial
review via the entire fairness test.
B. The Prevailing Narrative
It is well known that corporate law responds very differently
to claims of breach of the duty of care and breach of the duty of
loyalty.46 “A cardinal precept of the General Corporation Law of
the State of Delaware is that directors, rather than shareholders,
manage the business and affairs of the corporation.”47 This is the
foundation for the business judgment rule, which the Delaware
courts call “a presumption that in making a business decision the
directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith
and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best
interests of the company,”48 but which could also be considered a
deferential standard of review or even “a policy of non-review” for
duty of care cases.49 With respect to the decision-making process,
“director liability is predicated upon concepts of gross
negligence.”50 With respect to substance, directors’ decisions “will
not be disturbed if they can be attributed to any rational business
purpose.”51 It is clear to all that it is very difficult, if not impossible,
to prevail on a duty of care claim.52
By contrast, “it has been traditional for the duty of loyalty to
be articulated capaciously.”53 The following two passages are
46. See Velasco, supra note 7, at 827 (“The leniency of the business judgment
rule embodies the principle of directorial authority, while the strictness of the
entire fairness test embodies the principle of directorial accountability.”).
47. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984).
48. Id. at 812.
49. Velasco, supra note 7, at 828–29, 828 n.18 (citing sources).
50. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812.
51. Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971).
52. Under the business judgment rule alone, prevailing on a duty of care
claim is very difficult. When an exculpation provision is in place, it may be
impossible. For a discussion of exculpation provisions, see infra notes 275–279
and accompanying text.
53. Leo E. Strine, Jr. et al., Loyalty’s Core Demand: The Defining Role of
Good Faith in Corporation Law, 98 GEO. L.J. 629, 634 (2010); see, e.g., Cede & Co.
v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993) (stating that the Delaware
Supreme Court “has traditionally and consistently defined the duty of loyalty of
officers and directors to their corporation and its shareholders in broad and
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among the most iconic articulations of the duty of loyalty. The first
is from Meinhard v. Salmon54:
Joint adventurers, like copartners, owe to one another, while
the enterprise continues, the duty of the finest loyalty. Many
forms of conduct permissible in a workaday world for those
acting at arm’s length, are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary
ties. A trustee is held to something stricter than the morals of
the market place. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an
honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior. As
to this there has developed a tradition that is unbending and
inveterate. Uncompromising rigidity has been the attitude of
courts of equity when petitioned to undermine the rule of
undivided loyalty by the “disintegrating erosion” of particular
exceptions. . . . Only thus has the level of conduct for fiduciaries
been kept at a level higher than that trodden by the crowd. It
will not consciously be lowered by any judgment of this court.55

The second is from Guth v. Loft, Inc.:
Corporate officers and directors are not permitted to use their
position of trust and confidence to further their private
interests. While technically not trustees, they stand in a
fiduciary relation to the corporation and its stockholders. A
public policy, existing through the years, and derived from a
profound knowledge of human characteristics and motives, has
established a rule that demands of a corporate officer or
director, peremptorily and inexorably, the most scrupulous
observance of his duty, not only affirmatively to protect the
interests of the corporation committed to his charge, but also to
refrain from doing anything that would work injury to the
corporation, or to deprive it of profit or advantage which his skill
and ability might properly bring to it, or to enable it to make in
the reasonable and lawful exercise of its powers. The rule that
requires an undivided and unselfish loyalty to the corporation
demands that there shall be no conflict between duty and
self-interest.56

Passages such as these leave no doubt about the importance
of the duty of loyalty in corporate law. Although the opinions in
these passages may seem dated, they remain among the most

unyielding terms”).
54. 164 N.E. 545 (N.Y. 1928).
55. Id. at 546.
56. Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939).

DUTY OF LOYALTY

1047

quoted and celebrated passages in corporate fiduciary law. They
form the backdrop of the legal landscape of fiduciary duties.
Rather than continuing to emphasize the prohibition of all
conflicts of interest, however, corporate law today focuses attention
on methods of minimizing the negative impact of permissible
conflicts. The method that is most closely associated with the duty
of loyalty is strict judicial review.57 If there is a cognizable conflict
of interest, then the transaction must withstand scrutiny under
the entire fairness test.
Under the entire fairness test, the directors bear the burden
of establishing that the transaction in question is entirely fair to
the company and its shareholders.58 The inquiry has both a
procedural and a substantive component59:
The concept of fairness has two basic aspects: fair dealing
[process] and fair price [substance]. The former embraces
questions of when the transaction was timed, how it was
initiated, structured, negotiated, disclosed to the directors, and
how the approvals of the directors and the stockholders were
obtained. The latter aspect of fairness relates to the economic
and financial considerations of the proposed [transaction],
including all relevant factors: assets, market value, earnings,
future prospects, and any other elements that affect the
intrinsic or inherent value of a company’s stock. . . . However,
the test for fairness is not a bifurcated one as between fair
dealing and price. All aspects of the issue must be examined as
a whole since the question is one of entire fairness.60

This is a far cry from the deference that is the hallmark of the
business judgment rule.61

57. An alternative is to eliminate the conflict by relying on unconflicted
directors. See infra Part III.A (discussing disinterested review).
58. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 52 (Del. 2006)
(describing directors’ burden under the entire fairness test).
59. See Cede & Co., 634 A.2d at 361 (“Under the entire fairness standard of
judicial review, the defendant directors must establish to the court’s satisfaction
that the transaction was the product of both fair dealing and fair price.” (citing
Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1376 (Del. 1993); Mills Acquisition Co. v.
Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1279 (Del. 1989); Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457
A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983))).
60. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711 (Del. 1983).
61. See supra notes 46–52 and accompanying text (discussing deference in
the business judgment rule).
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The courts have described their scrutiny under the entire
fairness test as “careful,”62 “exacting,”63 “strict,”64 and “the most
searching and objective analysis.”65 “Not even an honest belief that
the transaction was entirely fair will be sufficient to establish
entire fairness. Rather, the transaction itself must be objectively
fair, independent of the board’s beliefs.”66
Far from being deferential, the entire fairness test has been
called “the highest standard of review in corporate law”67 and
“Delaware’s most onerous standard.”68 In fact, the courts have even
noted that “[b]ecause the effect of the proper invocation of the
business judgment rule is so powerful and the standard of entire
fairness so exacting, the determination of the appropriate
standard of judicial review frequently is determinative of the
outcome.”69
Why this dichotomy between care and loyalty? Although much
more can and has been written on the subject, it is largely because
of trust. Normally, we believe that we can trust directors to act in
the interests of shareholders, but this is not true when directors
have conflicts of interest.70 As the Delaware Supreme Court has
explained it,
In business judgment rule cases, an essential element is the fact
that there has been a business decision made by a disinterested
and independent corporate decisionmaker. . . . When there is no

62. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 710.
63. Paramount Comm., Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 42 n.9 (Del.
1994).
64. Solomon v. Armstrong, 747 A.2d 1098, 1112 (Del. Ch. 1999).
65. Gottlieb v. Heyden Chem. Corp., 90 A.2d 660, 663 (Del. 1952).
66. Gesoff v. IIC Indus., Inc., 902 A.2d 1130, 1145 (Del. Ch. 2006).
67. Kahn v. M & F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635, 644 (Del. 2014).
68. In re Cornerstone Therapeutics Inc., Stockholder Litig., 115 A.3d 1173,
1180 n.28 (Del. 2015) (quoting In re Trados Inc. S’holder Litig., 73 A.3d 17, 44
(Del. Ch. 2013)).
69. AC Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103, 111
(Del. Ch. 1986). But see infra note 120 and accompanying text (noting that the
application of the entire fairness test is not actually outcome determinative).
70. See Velasco, supra note 7, at 834–35 (“If the key insight of the business
judgment rule is that directors generally can be trusted, the key insight of the
entire fairness test is that this is not always so.”).
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independent corporate decisionmaker, the court may become
the objective arbiter.71

In other words, “director independence inheres in the rationale for
the business judgment rule.”72 However, when directors are
conflicted, courts are needed to step in and review their decisions.
Thus, as I have previously argued, “[t]he deference of the business
judgment rule is justifiable only because of, and also makes
possible, the rigor of the entire fairness test. The legitimacy of
either depends upon the other.”73
The business judgment rule arguably is the foundation of
corporate law.74 However, its theoretical justification is dependent
upon a rigorous enforcement of the duty of loyalty. Thus, it is
important to know whether judicial scrutiny via the entire fairness
test can carry the theoretical weight that is placed on its shoulders.
In the next Part, I will argue that it cannot. The duty of loyalty is
not enforced as rigorously as the prevailing narrative suggests,
and this undermines the entire theoretical structure of corporate
law.
III. Developments
In the previous Part, I set forth the prevailing narrative about
the duty of loyalty in corporate law: that conflicts of interest are
policed by a robust entire fairness test. In this Part, I will
demonstrate that the prevailing narrative is descriptively
inaccurate. The diminishment of the duty of loyalty that was
observed by Marsh long ago has continued to the point where,
today, fairness review plays only a minor role in policing conflicts
of interest.
I will point to five categories of developments that have
undermined the enforcement of the duty of loyalty. First,
legislative and judicial developments have permitted conflicted

71. Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1376 (Del. 1993); see also Oberly v.
Kirby, 592 A.2d 445, 467 (Del. 1991) (“The key to upholding an interested
transaction is the approval of some neutral decision-making body.”).
72. Schoon v. Smith, 953 A.2d 196, 207 (Del. 2008).
73. Velasco, supra note 7, at 827.
74. Supra note 47 and accompanying text.
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transactions to proceed without resort to judicial review.75 Second,
courts have limited the types of conflicts that they are willing to
recognize as raising duty of loyalty issues.76 Third, the rigor of
judicial scrutiny has been reduced from a strict entire fairness
review to a more forgiving range of fairness test.77 Fourth, it should
not be forgotten that the standing requirements for bringing a
derivative action also severely reduce the enforcement of the duty
of loyalty.78 Finally, corporate law statutes have been amended to
allow for the waiver of corporate opportunities, despite the loyalty
issues involved.79 The point of this Part is not to criticize any
particular development, but rather to paint a comprehensive
picture of the status quo. Enforcement of the duty of loyalty is not
as robust as is commonly believed.
A. Disinterested Review
When Marsh left off, conflicted transactions were never
automatically voidable but would always be subject to fairness
review.80 That is not how things stand today. Many transactions
involving interested directors are not subject to fairness review,
but actually receive the deference of the business judgment rule.81
One major impetus for the change was the widespread
adoption of sanitizing statutes, such as the 1967 adoption of
Section 144 in Delaware.82 Marsh noted this trend just before
Delaware adopted its provision.83 Such statutes generally abrogate
the common law rule by providing that conflicted transactions are
not void or voidable as long as they are approved by fully informed,
disinterested directors or shareholders, or are otherwise deemed
75. Infra Part III.A.
76. Infra Part III.B.
77. Infra Part III.C.
78. Infra Part III.D.
79. Infra Part III.E.
80. See Marsh, supra note 13, at 43 (discussing “[j]udicial review of the
fairness of the transaction” during the 1960s).
81. See, e.g., infra note 88 and accompanying text (discussing instances
where interested transactions are not subject to fairness review).
82. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (West 2017).
83. See Marsh, supra note 13, at 46–48 (noting the recent adoption of
sanitizing statutes).
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fair by the courts.84 On their face, they seem to provide that
conflicted transactions may be sanitized by any one of the three
listed methods.85 However, as Marsh noted, many courts at first
read the statute in a more limited manner86: as “merely remov[ing]
an ‘interested director’ cloud when its terms are met and
provid[ing] against invalidation of an agreement ‘solely’ because
such a director or officer is involved . . . [but not] remov[ing] the
transaction from judicial scrutiny.”87 Yet, over time, courts have
come to the view that satisfactory approval by directors or
shareholders generally invokes the business judgment rule after
all.88
Corporate law has extended these principles beyond the strict
confines of the statutory language. For example, transactions
involving controlling shareholders as such are not, as a technical
matter, covered by the language of Section 144.89 Nevertheless, the
courts held that such transactions would also be permitted along
84. See 1 EDWARD P. WELCH ET AL., FOLK ON THE DELAWARE GENERAL
CORPORATION LAW § 144.01, at 4-367 (6th ed. 2014-2 Supp) (“The principle of
voidability for interested transactions, which was sometimes characterized as the
common-law rule, was significantly ameliorated by the 1967 enactment of section
144 of the Delaware General Corporation Law.”).
85. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (providing that no transaction “shall be
void or voidable” because of a director interest or conflict if the transaction is
approved by fully-informed disinterested directors or fully informed shareholders,
or is deemed fair by the courts).
86. See Marsh, supra note 13, at 47 (“[T]here is a California decision which
indicates that the courts will in any event review the transaction for fairness
(whatever the statute says).”).
87. Fliegler v. Lawrence, 361 A.2d 218, 222 (Del. 1976).
88. See Benihana of Tokyo, Inc. v. Benihana, Inc. 906 A.2d 114, 120 (Del.
2006) (discussing disinterested director approval); cf. Corwin v. KKR Fin.
Holdings LLC, 125 A.3d 304, 311–13, 313 n.28 (Del. 2015) (discussing
“long-standing policy . . . to avoid the uncertainties and costs of judicial
second-guessing when the disinterested stockholders have had the free and
informed chance to decide . . . for themselves”). As a technical matter, Delaware
law does maintain a difference between the statutory framework and the
requirements of the common law; however, the two have largely run together such
that adequate director or shareholder approval (i.e., approval that is both
disinterested and independent) will invoke the business judgment rule. See
generally 1 STEPHEN A. RADIN ET AL., THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE: FIDUCIARY
DUTIES OF CORPORATE DIRECTORS 806–10 (6th ed. 2009).
89. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (discussing directors’ conflicted
transactions).
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similar lines.90 However, there was a substantial difference: such
transactions were always subject to judicial review. A controlling
shareholder was not required to obtain the approval of
independent directors or shareholders,91 but doing so would shift
the burden of proof on the issue of fairness.92 Originally, the cases
held that independent director or shareholder approval would not
invoke the business judgment rule out of concern that truly
independent approval might not be possible in the face of a
controlling shareholder.93 Recently, however, the Delaware
Supreme Court has decided that a controlling shareholder could
invoke the business judgment rule after all—by seeking the
approval of both independent directors and independent
shareholders.94 In the court’s opinion, the combination of two levels
of independent approval provides the optimal level of protection for
shareholder interests.95 Although this may be true, it clearly
reverses the court’s prior reticence.
The idea of substituting other neutral decisionmakers for
judicial review has a great deal of merit. However, it requires
confidence that the decisionmaker is, in fact, neutral.96 Otherwise,
90. See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 703 (Del. 1983) (allowing
majority shareholders to benefit from shareholder ratification). Although in some
respects this case was decided on the grounds of director conflict, it also involved
a controlling shareholder and has been regularly cited as precedent regarding
controlling shareholders.
91. See id. at 709 n.7 (“Although perfection is not possible, or expected, the
result here could have been entirely different if UOP had appointed an
independent negotiating committee of its outside directors to deal with Signal at
arm’s length.”).
92. See id. at 703 (discussing burden-shifting framework); Kahn v. Lynch
Comm. Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1117 (Del. 1994) (same); Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil
Co., 493 A.2d 929, 937 (Del. 1985) (same).
93. See Kahn, 638 A.2d at 1116–17 (“The controlling stockholder
relationship has the potential to influence, however subtly, the vote of [ratifying]
minority stockholders . . . .” (citing Citron v. I.E. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 584
A.2d 490, 502 (Del. Ch. 1990))).
94. See Kahn v. M & F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635, 645–46 (Del. 2014)
(adopting new test for controlling shareholder to invoke the business judgment
rule).
95. See id. at 644 (“‘[W]hen these two protections are established up-front, a
potent tool to extract good value for the minority is established.’” (citation
omitted)).
96. See supra notes 70–73 and accompanying text (emphasizing the
importance of trust in the independence of the decisionmaker).
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the extreme deference of the business judgment rule is
inappropriate. There is reason to question whether directors can
be considered entirely neutral. The principal reason is structural
bias:97 even a director who has no immediate financial interest in
a decision may be biased in favor of a fellow director or an officer
because of considerations of collegiality and friendship, for
example.98 Although structural bias is not as likely as a direct
conflict to lead to lying, cheating, or stealing, it is capable of
clouding disinterested directors’ objectivity.99 Thus, it undermines
confidence in the neutrality of the decisionmaker and suggests a
need for judicial review.
In short, the watering down of duty of loyalty has continued.
Marsh noted the move from a rule of strict voidability to a rule of
fairness review.100 Since his time, the courts have been moving to
a legal regime that, in many cases, eschews fairness review
altogether and allows transactions that involve acknowledged
conflicts of interest to receive the deference of the business
judgment rule.
B. Cognizability
The purpose of the duty of loyalty is to ensure that fiduciaries
pursue the interests of their beneficiaries, as opposed to anyone
else’s interests. The primary tool employed by the duty of loyalty
is a prohibition against fiduciaries acting with conflicts of interest.
The goal is to eliminate motivations that fiduciaries may have not
97. “The term ‘structural bias’ generally refers to the prejudice that members
of the board of directors may have in favor of one another and of management.”
Velasco, supra note 7, at 824. For other definitions of structural bias, see id. at
824 n.4.
98. See Velasco, supra note 7, at 856–65 (discussing three different
paradigms for understanding structural bias: implicit conspiracy, friendship and
collegiality, and in-group bias).
99. See, e.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del.
1985) (discussing the “omnipresent specter that a board may be acting primarily
in its own interests, rather than those of the corporation and its shareholders”);
Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 787 (Del. 1981) (discussing “where
inquiry as to independence . . . is sufficient safeguard against abuse, perhaps
subconscious abuse”).
100. Supra note 25 and accompanying text; see Marsh, supra note 13, at 43–
47 (discussing “[j]udicial review of the fairness of the transaction”).
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to pursue the interests of beneficiaries.101 The rationale is that
fiduciaries are far more likely to act in the interests of beneficiaries
if they have no reason not to do so.102 These general principles
apply in corporate law, but in a highly circumscribed manner.
Corporate law does not focus on all conflicts of interest, but is
much more concerned with a subset thereof. To raise a legally
cognizable loyalty issue, shareholders generally must assert that
the directors have engaged in self-dealing.103 “Classic examples
of . . . [self-dealing] involve either a director appearing on both
sides of a transaction or a director receiving a personal benefit from
a transaction not received by the shareholders generally.”104 To be
fair, self-dealing is not strictly required. However, the conflict
must “rise to the level of self-dealing”105 to invoke the entire
fairness test.106 Conflicts that fall short of that are effectively
ignored.107
When does a conflict rise to the level of self-dealing? Many
conflicts that might be thought to compromise a director’s
independence, such as friendship, are generally considered
insufficient.108 Generally, to be cognizable, a conflict must consist
of either a personal or familial financial interest.109 Even so, not all
101. See supra notes 19–21 and accompanying text (explaining the goal of the
duty of loyalty).
102. See supra note 21 and accompanying text (discussing “a wise public
policy that, for the purpose of removing all temptation, extinguishes all possibility
of profit flowing from a breach”); see also FRANKEL, supra note 19, at 108 (“[T]he
duty of loyalty is manifested by important preventative rules . . . [which] act to
dampen the fiduciaries’ temptations to misappropriate entrusted property or
power . . . .”).
103. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (citing Sinclair Oil
Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971)).
104. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 362 (Del. 1993).
105. Id. at 363 (citing Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812.
106. See id. (discussing the requirement of self-dealing); Sinclair Oil v.
Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971) (same).
107. See Sinclair Oil Corp., 280 A.2d at 722 (applying the business judgment
standard instead of the entire fairness test in the absence of self-dealing).
108. See Beam v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040, 1050 (Del. 2004) (“Not all
friendships, or even most of them, rise to this level and the Court cannot make a
reasonable inference that a particular friendship does so without specific factual
allegations to support such a conclusion.”).
109. See ALI, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 1.23 (1994)
(describing a director or officer as “interested” if “he or she is a party to the
transaction, or if a person with whom the director or officer has a business,
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financial conflicts will be sufficient to invoke the entire fairness
test. The financial interest generally must also be “material”110:
that is, it “requires a showing that such an interest is reasonably
likely to affect the decision-making process of a reasonable
person.”111 Moreover, materiality is determined on a subjective,
rather than an objective, level112—an “actual person” test rather
than a reasonable person test.113 Even so, courts have held that
director compensation will not be considered a material conflict,114
even though it can be fairly substantial as to directors of modest
means.115
Furthermore, even if the self-dealing of a director can be
established, it will not be sufficient to invoke the entire fairness
test. In order to do so, a plaintiff generally must show that a
majority of directors are conflicted under the same demanding
standard.116 Moreover, even if a majority of directors are conflicted,
financial or familial relationship, has a material pecuniary interest, or if the
director or officer is subject to controlling influence by a party to the transaction
or one having a pecuniary interest in it”).
110. If the case involves classic self-dealing, where the defendant is on both
sides of a transaction, a showing of materiality is not required. See Orman v.
Cullman, 794 A.2d 5, 26 & n.50 (Del. Ch. 2002) (discussing materiality
requirement); HMG/Courtland Props., Inc. v. Gray, 749 A.2d 94, 113–15 (Del. Ch.
1999) (same); Harbor Fin. Partners v. Huizenga, 751 A.2d 879, 887 n.20 (Del. Ch.
1999) (same).
111. Cede & Co., 634 A.2d at 363.
112. See Orman, 794 A.2d at 23 (“Materiality means that the alleged benefit
was significant enough ‘in the context of the director’s economic circumstances, as
to have made it improbable that the director could perform her fiduciary
duties . . . .’” (citations omitted)).
113. See Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156, 1167 (Del. 1995)
(“[T]he ‘actual person’ test requires an independent judicial determination
regarding the materiality of the ‘given’ director’s self-interest.”).
114. See Grobow v. Perot, 539 A.2d 180, 188 (1988) (“Plaintiffs plead no facts
demonstrating a financial interest on the part of GM’s directors . . . [except] the
allegation that all GM’s directors are paid for their services as directors. However,
such allegations, without more, do not establish any financial interest.”).
115. See, e.g., In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 731 A.2d 342, 359–60
(Del. Ch. 1998) (concluding that, even though the director was “the principal of
the elementary school that [the CEO’s] children once attended,” she was not
conflicted “merely because of the relatively substantial compensation provided by
the board membership compared to their outside salaries”).
116. See Orman, 794 A.2d at 22 (“To rebut successfully business judgment
rule presumptions . . . , thereby leading to the application of the entire fairness
standard, a plaintiff must normally plead facts demonstrating ‘that a majority of
the director defendants have a financial interest in the transaction or were

1056

75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1035 (2018)

it remains possible for them to turn the matter over to a committee
of disinterested directors to decide the matter.117 And, as we will
see, even if directors fail this test, it may be possible for them to
get a second bite at the apple.118
These are fairly difficult obstacles for plaintiffs to overcome.
As a result, many real conflicts that could and actually do affect a
director’s judgment are effectively ignored. If this were the
standard for review on the merits, it might be appropriate.
However, it is the standard used to determine whether there will
be any review on the merits. After all, if a case does not involve a
conflict that rises to the level of self-dealing, it is relegated to the
extreme deference of the business judgment rule. As a result, many
real conflicts will escape review under the corporate law duty of
loyalty.
C. Fairness
Even if the plaintiffs can invoke the entire fairness test
successfully, their problems are far from over. This is because the
meaning of fairness review itself has undergone significant change
over the years. Once upon a time, the entire fairness test was
described in very demanding terms.119 This is no longer true.
Recently, courts have begun to opine that the entire fairness
test is not so demanding after all. Courts will note, for example,
that the test is not actually outcome determinative.120 Where
dominated or controlled by a materially interested director.’” (citations omitted)).
117. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(c) (West 2017); see Stegemeier v. Magness,
728 A.2d 557, 562 (Del. 1999)
The absolute prohibition under common law against self-dealing
by a trustee has been modified in the corporate setting to offer
a safe harbor for the directors of a corporation if the transaction
is approved by a majority of disinterested directors.
Transactions approved by the directors are therefore not
voidable because there are interested directors, if a committee
of disinterested directors approves the transaction. In such a
case the directors are protected by the business judgment rule.
118. See infra note 159 and accompanying text (discussing the creation of
special litigation committees).
119. See supra notes 62–69 and accompanying text (describing the entire
fairness test as “the highest standard of review in corporate law”).
120. See Cinerama, 663 A.2d at 1163 (“[A]n initial judicial determination that
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courts used to speak of rigor, they now emphasize that the test does
not demand a perfect decision.121 Moreover, the Delaware Court of
Chancery has increasingly taken to speaking of a “range of fair
value”122—which even it has referred to as “amorphous.”123 Such
language is strongly suggestive of the possibility that directors can
be somewhat off the mark but still in compliance. This is not “the
most scrupulous inherent fairness,”124 but more like mere fairness.
The use of the term “range” is significant. It is undoubtedly
true that fair value is not a clear, discrete point, and thus could be
considered to be a range. However, a range implies both an upper
and lower limit. But there should be no upper limit to fairness
review: an overly-generous offer would certainly pass the fairness
test. Thus, fairness is actually a threshold, not a range. What the
use of the term “range” does, as a rhetorical matter, is blur the
lower limit, making it more difficult to assert that any given value
is unfair. Courts should be asking whether it is clear that the given
value is fair to shareholders; instead, they are starting to ask
whether it is in the ballpark. Thus, shifting the rhetoric from “the
most scrupulous inherent fairness” to a “range of fair value” waters
down the standard of review significantly.
a given breach of a board’s fiduciary duties has rebutted the presumption of the
business judgment rule does not preclude a subsequent judicial determination
that the board action was entirely fair, and is, therefore, not
outcome-determinative per se.”); see also Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1376
(Del. 1993) (“It is sometimes thought that the decision whether to apply the
business judgment rule or the entire fairness test can be outcomedeterminative. . . . Application of the entire fairness rule does not, however,
always implicate liability of the conflicted corporate decisionmaker, nor does it
necessarily render the decision void.”).
121. See Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156, 1179 (Del. 1995)
(“A finding of perfection is not a sine qua non in an entire fairness analysis.”); see
also Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 709 n.7 (stating that “perfection is
not possible, or expected”); Dell, Inc. v. Magnetar Glob. Event Driven Master
Fund Ltd., 177 A.3d 1, 23 (Del. 2017) (“To be sure, ‘fair value’ does not equal ‘best
value.’” (citation omitted)).
122. See, e.g., Reis v. Hazelett Strip-Casting Corp., 28 A.3d 442, 465 (Del. Ch.
2011) (“When conducting a fair price inquiry as part of the entire fairness
standard of review, the court asks whether the transaction was one ‘that a
reasonable seller, under all of the circumstances, would regard as within a range
of fair value; one that such a seller could reasonably accept.’” (quoting Cinerama,
663 A.2d at 1143)).
123. In re Cox Comm., Inc. S’holders Litig., 879 A.2d 604, 619 (Del. Ch. 2010).
124. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 710.
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In addition, the courts have deemphasized the need for
directors to “establish ‘to the court’s satisfaction that the
transaction was the product of both fair dealing and fair price,”125
and have begun to focus on the importance of the substantive
component of price.126 Although this might seem to be a
shareholder-friendly development, there are at least two reasons
why it is not necessarily so. First, as just mentioned, the rigor of
price analysis has been watered down by the “range of fairness”
analysis. This makes the process, or dealing, component relatively
more important. Second, courts are much less expert with respect
to the substance of business decisions than they are with respect
to process. Because it is difficult to be confident about price, courts
also need to scrutinize the process by which the price was derived.
After all, it is difficult to see how a price that could have been
improved with a fair process could be considered fair, no matter
how generous it may seem. Thus, in at least some cases,
shareholders may be shortchanged by a truncated analysis.
To show how low the standard of review has fallen, one need
only consider the case of Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc.127 In
that case, the Delaware Supreme Court held that although the
directors were grossly negligent, the transaction was nevertheless
entirely fair to the shareholders.128 As a formal matter, that is not
a logical inconsistency. However, it does seem odd that conduct
that failed under the very deferential standard could nevertheless
be upheld under the more demanding standard. More importantly,
the process was anything but fair, given the presence of gross
negligence. The trial court even “recognize[d] the force of the claim
that a process that is uninformed can never be fair to
shareholders.”129 However, such concerns did not weigh the court
down very far. It held that, despite the directors’ gross negligence,
the transaction was entirely fair—not just fair, but entirely fair!—
125. Cinerama, 663 A.2d at 1163 (quoting Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634
A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993)).
126. See, e.g., Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 711 (“[I]n a non-fraudulent transaction
we recognize that price may be the preponderant consideration . . . .”); Kahn v.
M & F Worldwide, 88 A.3d 635, 644–45 (Del. 2014) (emphasizing the importance
of price in a fairness analysis).
127. Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156 (Del. 1995).
128. Id. at 1179–80.
129. Id. at 1178 (quoting Cinerama, 663 A.2d at 1140).
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to the shareholders.130 It seems reasonable to question whether
fairness review can be as demanding as is commonly believed if a
transaction that fails under the deferential standards of the
business judgment rule can nevertheless prevail under the entire
fairness test.
D. Standing
In order to appreciate how weak the duty of loyalty has
become, we need to consider another set of issues: the difficulty in
pursuing derivative litigation. Most often, when a director
breaches the duty of loyalty, it is the corporation itself that has
been harmed directly.131 Shareholders are harmed only indirectly,
by virtue of their ownership interest in the corporation.132 Thus,
shareholders do not have a direct cause of action against the
directors; the corporation does.133 However, because of the obvious
problem in relying on directors to cause the corporation to sue
themselves, courts have allowed shareholders to bring derivative
actions on the corporation’s behalf—but only under certain
circumstances.134 The general idea is to allow directors to manage
the company by making litigation decisions except when conflicts
of interest prevent them from exercising their business
judgment.135
Courts are not only concerned with director prerogative,
however. They are also concerned with vexatious litigation
130. Id. at 1179–80.
131. See Kramer v. W. Pac. Indus., 546 A.2d 348, 351 (Del. 1984) (“In such a
suit [i.e., a ‘shareholder’s derivative suit’], the shareholder sues on behalf of the
corporation for harm done to it.”).
132. See Tooley v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc., 845 A.2d 1031, 1037
(Del. 2004) (“[T]he indirect injury to the stockholders arising out of the harm to
the corporation comes about solely by virtue of their stockholdings.”).
133. See id. at 1036 (“The derivative suit has been generally described as ‘one
of the most interesting and ingenious of accountability mechanisms for large
formal organizations.’ It enables a stockholder to bring suit on behalf of the
corporation for harm done to the corporation.”).
134. See Lewis v. Anderson, 477 A.2d 1040, 1046 (Del. 1984) (“A derivative
action allows a shareholder to circumvent a board’s refusal to bring a suit on a
claim.”).
135. See Tooley, 845 A.2d at 1034 (discussing derivative actions); see also
Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811–12 (Del. 1984) (same).
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pursued by entrepreneurial attorneys.136 Thus, the courts have
come up with various tests and procedures to weed out undesirable
litigation. Each of these developments may have been entirely
sensible. In the aggregate, however, these tests may weed out
many legitimate shareholder claims.
One requirement for standing to bring a derivative action is
known as the contemporaneous ownership rule.137 In general, a
plaintiff must have been “a stockholder of the corporation at the
time of the transaction of which such stockholder complains,”138
and must “maintain their shareholder status throughout the
litigation.”139 Although this may be useful as a litigation
management device,140 it is an arbitrary requirement that is not
necessarily tied to the economic harm caused by a breach of
fiduciary duty.141
Perhaps the most difficult hurdle that a shareholder plaintiff
must clear is the demand requirement.142 Before shareholders are
permitted to initiate a derivative action, they must make a demand
136. See Aronson, 473 A.2d at 811–12 (“[T]he demand requirement . . . exists
[inter alia] . . . to provide a safeguard against strike suits.”). There are numerous
discussions of the concept of attorneys acting like businessmen. See generally
John C. Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation: Balancing
Fairness and Efficiency in the Large Class Action, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 877 (1987);
Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s Role in Class
Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for
Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1991); Roberta Romano, The Shareholder Suit:
Litigation Without Foundation, 7 J.L. ECON. ORG. 55 (1991). For more favorable
perspectives, see generally Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Do Class Action Lawyers Make
Too Little?, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 2043 (2010); Myriam Gilles & Gary B. Friedman,
Exploding the Class Action Agency Costs Myth: The Social Utility of
Entrepreneurial Lawyers, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 103 (2006).
137. See WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., 13 FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE
LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §§ 5981–5981.50, at 138–57 (perm. ed., rev. vol.
2004) (discussing standing requirements for derivative actions).
138. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 327 (West 2017).
139. Parfi Holding AB v. Mirror Image Internet, Inc., 954 A.2d 911, 935 (Del.
Ch. 2008).
140. See FLETCHER ET AL., supra note 137, § 5981.10, at 146–47 (discussing
the contemporaneous ownership rule).
141. See generally J. Travis Laster, Goodbye to the Contemporaneous
Ownership Requirement, 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 673 (2008).
142. See DEL. CH. CT. R. 23.1 (2007) (“The complaint shall also allege with
particularity the efforts, if any, made by the plaintiff to obtain the action the
plaintiff desires from the directors . . . and the reasons for the plaintiff’s failure to
obtain the action or for not making the effort.”).
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on the board of directors.143 Theoretically, this enables directors to
pursue the matter in an appropriate way.144 However, in practice
it enables directors to decide that the matter is not worth pursuing.
Some states provide that a demand is not required if it would
be futile because of director conflicts.145 However, in order to claim
demand futility, shareholders bear a heavy pleading burden.146
First, they must allege facts with particularity;147 conclusory
allegations are insufficient.148 Second, they must show “that a
majority of the board of directors either has a financial interest in
the challenged transaction or lacks independence or otherwise
failed to exercise due care”149—essentially, “that the directors are
incapable of making an impartial decision regarding such
litigation.”150 These are significant obstacles. And all of this must
be done on the pleadings—without the benefit of discovery.151
143. See id. (same).
144. See generally Grimes v. Donald, 673 A.2d 1207, 1216–17 (Del. 1996);
Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811–12 (Del. 1984); Levine v. Smith, 591 A.2d
194, 200 (Del. 1991).
145. Some states universally require demand. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT
ANN. § 7.42 (“A shareholder may not commence a derivative proceeding until . . . a
written demand has been made upon the corporation to take suitable
action . . . .”).
146. See Levine v. Smith, 591 A.2d 194, 207 (Del. 1991) (“Plaintiff’s pleading
burden under Rule 23.1 is also more onerous than that required to withstand a
Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.”).
147. See Aronson, 473 A.2d at 808 & n.1 (“[D]emand can only be excused
where facts are alleged with particularity . . . .”).
148. See Grobow v. Perot, 539 A.2d 180, 187 (Del. 1988) (“[W]ell-pleaded
allegations of fact must be accepted as true; conclusionary allegations of fact or
law not supported by allegations of specific fact may not be taken as true.”).
149. Levine, 591 A.2d at 205; see also Grimes, 673 A.2d at 1216 (discussing
requirements to excuse demand). The actual test requires plaintiffs to establish
“a reasonable doubt that ‘(1) the directors are disinterested and independent [or]
(2) the challenged transaction was otherwise the product of a valid exercise of
business judgment.’” Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927, 932 n.6 (Del. 1993) (quoting
Aronson, 473 A.2d at 814). It is worth noting that this “reasonable doubt”
standard bears no resemblance to its criminal law namesake. It actually requires
shareholders to create a reasonable belief. See Grimes, 673 A.2d at 1217 n.17
(“Stated obversely, the concept of reasonable doubt is akin to the concept that the
stockholder has a ‘reasonable belief’ that the board lacks independence or that
the transaction was not protected by the business judgment rule.”).
150. Rales, 634 A.2d at 932; see also Levine, 591 A.2d at 205 (“On either
showing, it may be inferred that the Board is incapable of exercising its power
and authority to pursue the derivative claims directly.”).
151. See Rales, 634 A.2d at 934–35, 934 n.10 (“[D]erivative plaintiffs may
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To be fair, the courts have noted that shareholders have the
right to inspect corporate books and records, and may seek to avail
themselves of this right before pursuing a derivative action.152
However, the right is far from absolute: shareholders must
demonstrate a proper purpose,153 and investigating possible
misconduct is not a proper purpose unless shareholders can
provide some evidence in advance.154 Moreover, if shareholders do
gain access to books and records, they are unlikely to find much.
Directors and their lawyers know very well how to sanitize
corporate documents so as not to incriminate themselves.155
The difficulty of pleading demand futility might suggest that
making a demand is the better option. However, shareholders have
no choice but to plead demand futility because the Delaware courts
have held that making a demand waives any claim of demand
futility,156 and causes the board’s subsequent refusal to be
reviewed under the business judgment rule.157 This is a strange
holding: there is no logical problem with pleading in the
alternative, and plaintiffs generally are free to do so in most
believe it is difficult to meet the particularized requirement of Aronson because
they are not entitled to discovery . . . .”).
152. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220 (West 2017) (providing that shareholders
have a statutory right to inspect the corporations’ books and records); see also
Grimes v. Donald, 673 A.2d 1207, 1216 n.11 (Del. 1996) (discussing “tools at
hand”); Rales, 634 A.2d at 934 n.10 (“[Shareholders] have many avenues available
to obtain information bearing on the subject of their claims.”).
153. See Seinfeld v. Verizon Comm., Inc., 909 A.2d 117, 121 (Del. 2006) (“In a
section 220 action, a stockholder has the burden of proof to demonstrate a proper
purpose by a preponderance of the evidence.”).
154. See id at 123 (“Stockholders [must] show, by a preponderance of the
evidence, a credible basis from which the Court of Chancery can infer there is
possible mismanagement that would warrant further investigation . . . .”).
155. See, e.g., Leo J. Strine, Jr., Documenting the Deal: How Quality Control
and Candor Can Improve Boardroom Decision-Making and Reduce the Litigation
Target Zone, 70 BUS. LAW. 679, 680, 695 (2015) (discussing how directors sanitize
their documents “to ensure that no advice is reflected in the record that would be
inconsistent” with fairness).
156. See Rales, 634 A.2d at 935 n.12 (Del. 1993) (“Where a demand has
actually been made, the stockholder making the demand concedes the
independence and disinterestedness of a majority of the board to respond.”); see
also Grimes, 673 A.2d at 1218–29 (making a demand waives demand futility but
does not “waive the right to claim that demand has been wrongfully refused”).
157. See Spiegel v. Buntrock, 571 A.2d 767, 775–76 (Del. 1990) (reviewing a
refused demand); see also Levine v. Smith, 591 A.2d 194, 212 (Del. 1991) (same).
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litigation.158 Yet, this option is denied to plaintiffs in derivative
litigation, forcing them to make crucial decisions very early on.
The situation is worse still. Even after a derivative action has
been properly initiated, directors may be able to establish an
independent committee to dismiss the lawsuit.159 With all of these
procedural hurdles, one must marvel at the ability of litigants ever
to get a day in court in the first place. While such procedures surely
block a great deal of vexatious litigation, it almost certainly blocks
much meritorious litigation as well.
E. Corporate Opportunities
One final development is worth noting. It is now possible,
under the laws of some states, for corporations to waive corporate
opportunities in advance.160 This is theoretically significant
because corporate opportunities fall under the scope of the duty of
loyalty, which is supposed to be mandatory rather than a default
rule.161
In 2000, the Delaware General Corporation Law was amended
to provided that
[e]very corporation . . . shall have power to . . . [r]enounce, in its
certificate of incorporation or by action of its board of directors,
any interest or expectancy of the corporation in, or in being
158. Cf. Levine, 591 A.2d at 207, 211 (noting that Rule 23.1 represents a
marked departure from notice pleading requirements).
159. See generally Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981)
(allowing directors to establish an independent committee after litigation has
begun).
160. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 122(17) (West 2017) (allowing
corporations to “[r]enounce . . . any interest or expectancy of the corporation
in, . . . business opportunities that are presented to the corporation of 1 or more
of its officers, directors or stockholders”); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1016(17)
(West 2017) (“Every corporation created pursuant to the provisions of the
Oklahoma General Corporation Act shall have power to . . . [r]enounce in its
certificate of incorporation . . . interest or expectancy of the corporation
in . . . specified
business
opportunities.”);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 23B.02.020(5)(k) (West 2017) (“The articles of incorporation may contain . . . [a]
provision limiting or eliminating any duty of a director . . . to offer the corporation
the right to have or participate in any . . . business opportunities . . . .”).
161. See Gabriel Rauterberg & Eric Talley, Contracting Out of the Fiduciary
Duty of Loyalty: An Empirical Analysis of Corporate Opportunity Waivers, 117
COLUM. L. REV. 1075, 1077 (2017) (discussing the scope of the duty of loyalty).
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offered an opportunity to participate in, specified business
opportunities or specified classes or categories of business
opportunities that are presented to the corporation or 1 or more
of its officers, directors or stockholders.162

Eight states have since adopted similar provisions.163 In the
absence of such provisions, it would be problematic for an officer or
director to take personal advantage of a business opportunity that
is deemed a corporate opportunity. Some states require corporate
consent based on full disclosure,164 while Delaware requires only
that the fiduciary treat the corporation fairly.165 In any event, all
decisions are made in light of the specific facts.166 Under the new
laws, however, corporations can waive some or all interests in
corporate opportunities in advance, without respect to the
particular circumstances. It might not be entirely surprising that
such a waiver could be effected by charter amendment, which
would require shareholder approval. However, it is noteworthy
that it can be done by directors acting on their own.
The significance of this development is difficult to assess.
Theoretically, directors have always had the power to waive
corporate opportunity issues; these new laws merely give them
greater latitude in doing so. Moreover, it must be noted that
Delaware reserves the right to review the waiver for breach of
fiduciary duty.167 However, whether such review is as effective as
reviewing the circumstances of each opportunity for fairness is
questionable. Empirically, Professors Gabriel Rauterberg and Eric
Talley have found fairly widespread use of such provisions without
162. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 122(17).
163. See Rauterberg & Talley, supra note 161, at 107 n.11 (citing statutes).
164. See, e.g., Ne. Harbor Golf Club, Inc. v. Harris, 661 A.2d 1146, 1151–52
(Me. 1995) (requiring disclosure and consent in every instance).
165. See generally Broz v. Cellular Info. Sys., Inc., 673 A.2d 148 (Del. 1996).
166. See Rauterberg & Talley, supra note 161, at 1089 (stating that the law
“has always permitted boards of directors to ‘reject’ a corporate opportunity ex
post—after it has emerged and has been properly presented to the company by a
fiduciary interested in pursuing it personally”).
167. The legislative history provides that the provision “does not change the
level of judicial scrutiny that will apply to the renunciation of an interest or
expectancy of the corporation in a business opportunity, which will be determined
based on the common law of fiduciary duty, including the duty of loyalty.”
Delaware Bill Summary, S. 363, 140th Gen. Assembly (Del. 2000); 72 Del. Laws,
c. 343, § 3 (2000).
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deleterious effects upon shareholders.168 Thus, it may be that such
provisions are harmless. However, it also may be that their
abusive potential has yet to be realized. Regardless of whether or
not the development is justifiable, it would be difficult to deny that
it diminishes the robustness of the duty of loyalty.
F. Conclusion
It should be clear by now that the duty of loyalty has been
weakened significantly over time. According to Marsh, “[i]n 1880
it could have been stated with confidence that in the United States
the general rule was that any contract between a director and his
corporation was voidable at the instance of the corporation or its
shareholders, without regard to the fairness or unfairness of the
transaction.”169 Today, by contrast, it is extremely difficult to
prevail on a duty of loyalty claim. There are procedures to allow
directors to engage in conflicted transactions without any judicial
review. Moreover, judicial review is not available for all conflicts of
interest, but only those that rise to the level of self-dealing. Even
if self-dealing is established, the courts may allow the transaction
to survive if it falls within a range of fairness. But, even that is
only true if the shareholders are able to make particularized
allegations of demand futility without the benefit of discovery.
Even if each of these developments is entirely appropriate, it is
difficult to deny that the overall effect is significant.
IV. Counter-Developments
It would be unfair to suggest that all developments regarding
the duty of loyalty have had the effect of watering down
shareholder protections against director conflicts. The point of the
previous Part was merely to establish that the duty of loyalty has
been watered down significantly and is not as robust as commonly
believed. In this section, I will address a few developments that,
over the years, have seemed to offer promise of revitalizing the

168.
169.

See generally Rauterberg & Talley, supra note 161.
Marsh, supra note 13, at 36.
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duty of loyalty. As will become clear, however, the developments
have not, to date, panned out as hoped.
A. Intermediate Standards of Review
One development that offered hope for the strengthening of
the duty of loyalty has been the creation of various intermediate
standards of review for situations that involve conflicts that may
not quite rise to the level of self-dealing.170 Many such standards
have been developed,171 but this section will briefly address three
prototypical tests. The first is the Unocal/Unitrin standard for
review of hostile takeover defenses; the second is the Zapata test
for reviewing the decision of a special litigation committee to
dismiss a derivative action in a demand-excused situation.172 The
third is not always considered an intermediate standard of review,
but functions as such: it is the shift in the burden of proof on the
issue of fairness when a conflicted transaction has received
disinterested approval.173 Although each of these tests had very
promising beginnings, they failed to live up to their expectations.
Consider first the Unocal/Unitrin standard. In Unocal Corp.
v. Mesa Petroleum Co.,174 the court was faced with a challenge to
takeover defenses implemented by a board of directors confronting
a hostile takeover.175 The court appreciated the nature of the
threat posed by the hostile offer, deeming it “a classic coercive
measure” that demanded a response,176 but also recognized the
“omnipresent specter that a board may be acting primarily in its
own interests, rather than those of the corporation and its

170. See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Divergence of Standards of Conduct and
Standards of Review in Corporate Law, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 437, 467 (1993)
(“[T]he emergence of these intermediate standards of review has been one of the
major recent developments in corporate law.”).
171. Id.; see also William T. Allen et al., Function Over Form: A Reassessment
of Standards of Review in Delaware Corporation Law, 56 BUS. LAW. 1287, 1309–
16 (2001) (discussing strategy to streamline intermediate standards of review).
172. See generally Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d. 779 (Del. 1981).
173. See generally Kahn v. Lynch Comm. Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110 (Del. 1994).
174. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
175. Id. at 952.
176. Id. at 956.
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shareholders.”177 To balance the competing interests, the court
developed a two-part test for review of hostile takeover defenses:
first, “directors must show that they had reasonable grounds for
believing that a danger to corporate policy and effectiveness
existed.”178 Second, the defensive measures “must be reasonable in
relation to the threat posed.”179 This “reasonableness” and
“proportionality” inquiry sounds entirely reasonable, and there
was great hope that it would be an effective intermediate standard
of review lying somewhere in between the deference of the business
judgment rule and the rigor of the entire fairness test. But, in the
end, it skewed heavily towards the business judgment rule.180
Moreover, ten years later, in Unitrin, Inc. v. American Gen.
Corp.,181 the Delaware Supreme Court would rewrite the Unocal
test. By noting “a direct correlation between findings of
proportionality
or
disproportionality
and
the
judicial
determination of whether a defensive response was draconian
because it was either coercive or preclusive . . . ,”182 the court
effectively transformed the second prong of the Unocal test from a
reasonableness inquiry into a prohibition against draconian
measures only. Thus, the Unocal/Unitrin standard did not live up
to its promise of being a true intermediate standard of review. It
turns out that “enhanced scrutiny” is rather deferential after all.183
Consider next Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado.184 The case
involved a derivative action in which demand had already been
excused as futile.185 Nevertheless, the board created a special
litigation committee to consider whether the case should be

177. Id. at 954.
178. Id. at 955.
179. Id.
180. For a more detailed discussion, see Velasco, supra note 7, at 847; cf.
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Unocal at 20: Director Primacy in Corporate Takeovers,
31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 769, 862 (2006) (“Note how the balance again tips towards
authority values even in a context charged with conflicts of interest.”).
181. 651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995).
182. Id. at 1387.
183. See, e.g., Air Prods. & Chem. v. Airgas, 16 A.3d 48, 55 (Del. Ch. 2011)
(“[A]s Delaware law currently stands, the answer must be that the power to defeat
an inadequate hostile tender offer ultimately lies with the board of directors.”).
184. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981).
185. Id. at 780.
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dismissed, and the committee decided that it should.186 The court
had to decide whether the committee’s decision should be
respected.187 The court concluded that “an independent committee
possesses the corporate power to seek the termination of a
derivative suit,”188 but acknowledged that “there [was] sufficient
risk in the realities of [the] situation [—essentially, structural
bias—] . . . to justify caution.”189
The court developed a two-part test for reviewing such
decisions. “First, the Court should inquire into the independence
and good faith of the committee and the bases supporting its
conclusions.”190 Second, “[t]he Court should determine, applying its
own independent business judgment, whether the motion should
be granted.”191 The first prong of this test does some work—
although we will consider in the next section exactly how much it
really does.192 The second prong, however, does very little.
According to the Zapata court, “[t]he second step is intended to
thwart instances where corporate actions meet the criteria of step
one, but the result does not appear to satisfy its spirit.”193 Despite
the good intentions of the Delaware Supreme Court, the test it
created has not had a significant impact. As a matter of practice,
the courts do not tend to uphold a committee’s decision under the
first prong only to reverse it under the second prong.194 Thus, the
Zapata test does little to enhance the duty of loyalty.
Finally, consider the Kahn cases, which set forth the standard
of review for cases involving transactions with controlling

186. Id. at 781.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 785.
189. Id. at 787.
190. Id. at 788.
191. Id. at 789.
192. See infra Part IV.B (considering the difference between the
disinterestedness and independence inquiries).
193. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 789 (Del. 1981).
194. For a rare example of a case in which the second prong was an important
part of the analysis, see Kahn v. Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co., L.P., 23 A.3d 831
(Del. 2011) (remanding for consideration under the second prong of Zapata); In re
Primedia, Inc. S’holders Litig., 67 A.3d 455 (Del. Ch. 2013) (reversing previous
decision to grant motion to dismiss).
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shareholders.195 In Kahn v. Lynch Comm. Sys., Inc.,196 the
Delaware Supreme Court held that, when a controlling
shareholder has a conflict of interests, approval by fully-informed,
independent directors or fully-informed minority shareholders will
not invoke the business judgment rule, but only shift the burden
of proof on the issue of fairness.197 The rationale is that, because of
the power of the controlling shareholder, we could not trust that
the approvals obtained would be fully objective and consensual.198
The concern goes beyond mere structural bias into a concern that
conflicts will not be subject to adequate independent review. More
recently, in Kahn v. M & F Worldwide Corp.,199 the Delaware
Supreme Court held that if a controlling shareholder obtains the
approval of both fully informed, disinterested and independent
directors and fully informed minority shareholders, then the
business judgment rule shall apply.200 The rationale was that the
combined procedures provide adequate, and indeed optimal,
protection for shareholders.201 This may very well be the
appropriate decision. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that the
intermediate standard of review also found its way back to the
business judgment rule.
The point of this section is not to argue the merits of the
development of intermediate standards of review. It is merely to
note that intermediate standards of review have not panned out as
expected. Despite their initial good intentions, courts seem
inevitably to find their way back to a deferential standard of
review.

195. Kahn v. Lynch Comm. Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110 (Del. 1994); Kahn v. M
& F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635 (Del. 2014).
196. 638 A.2d 1110 (Del. 1994).
197. Id. at 1117.
198. Id. at 1116–17.
199. 88 A.3d 635 (Del. 2014).
200. Id. at 645–47.
201. See id. at 64445 (listing multiple justifications for applying the business
judgment rule).
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B. Independence

Another promising development has been the courts’
willingness to extend the conflicts inquiry beyond mere
disinterestedness to include the concept of independence. The
concept of “interest” and “disinterestedness” is concerned
primarily with direct financial ties: “A director is considered
interested where he or she will receive a personal financial benefit
from a transaction that is not equally shared by the
stockholders . . . [or] where a corporate decision will have a
materially detrimental impact on a director, but not on the
corporation and the stockholders.”202 However, the courts are well
aware that people can be conflicted by concerns other than
money.203 They have tried to address this gap with the broader
inquiry of independence. “Independence means that a director’s
decision is based on the corporate merits of the subject before the
board rather than extraneous considerations or influences.”204
Such an inquiry would seem to hold great promise for
strengthening the duty of loyalty substantially. However, the
independence inquiry is not quite as robust as it may seem.
It does not, for example, act as a proxy for structural bias.205
The leading case on the issue is Beam v. Stewart.206 There, the
issue was whether the other directors were independent of the
controlling shareholder.207 The court acknowledged the possibility
that “[a] variety of motivations, including friendship, may
influence the demand futility inquiry.”208 However, the court
remained skeptical: “Not all friendships, or even most of them, rise
202. Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927, 936 (Del. 1993); see also Pogostin v.
Rice, 480 A.2d 619, 624 (“Directorial interest exists whenever divided loyalties
are present, or a director has received, or is entitled to receive, a personal
financial benefit from the challenged transaction which is not equally shared by
the stockholders.”).
203. See, e.g., infra notes 237–238 and accompanying text (discussing
non-monetary conflicts of interest).
204. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 816 (Del. 1984).
205. For a description of structural bias, see supra notes 97–99 and
accompanying text.
206. Beam v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040 (Del. 2004).
207. See id. at 1045 (“We now address the plaintiff’s allegations concerning
the independence of the other board members.”).
208. Id. at 1050.
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to this level . . . .”209 Only “a particularly close or intimate personal
or business affinity” would seem to do so.210 The plaintiff must
persuade the court.211 Essentially, plaintiffs have to show that “the
non-interested director would be more willing to risk his or her
reputation than risk the relationship with the interested
director.”212 This, of course, flies in the face of structural bias
theory. The structural bias argument is not so much that directors
are willing to engage in conscious misconduct as that subtle biases
make it inappropriate to grant them the deference of the business
judgment rule.213 Because the court rejected the essential premises
of structural bias theory, it is not entirely surprising that it would
conclude that “[a]llegations that Stewart and the other directors
moved in the same social circles, attended the same weddings,
developed business relationships before joining the board, and
described each other as ‘friends,’ even when coupled with Stewart’s
94% voting power, are insufficient, without more, to rebut the
presumption of independence.”214
It turns out that independence amounts to little more than “an
inquiry into whether the director’s decision resulted from that
director being controlled by another.”215 Courts typically ask
whether directors are “dominated” by216 or “beholden” to217 others,
209. Id.
210. Id. at 1051.
211. See id. at 1050 (“[T]he Court cannot make a reasonable inference that a
particular friendship does so without specific factual allegations to support such
a conclusion.”); see also id. at 1051 (“The difficulty with structural bias in a
demand futile case is simply one of establishing it in the complaint . . . .” (quoting
Aronson, 473 A.2d at 815 n.8)).
212. Id. at 1052.
213. See Velasco, supra note 7, at 86570 (explaining the theory of
structural bias); see also id. at 861
[S]tructural bias extends much further than conscious discrimination
into the realm of semi-conscious, and even unconscious, bias. It is this
less-than-conscious aspect that makes structural bias so dangerous
and intractable. The claim is not that disinterested directors are
dishonest or self-serving; rather, it is that even disinterested directors
are not—indeed, cannot be—truly impartial.
214. Beam v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040, 1051 (Del. 2004).
215. Orman v. Cullman, 794 A.2d 5, 25 n.50 (Del. Ch. 2002).
216. Grobow v. Perot, 539 A.2d 180, 189 (Del. 1988).
217. Rales v. Blasand, 634 A.2d 927, 936 (Del. 1993); Aronson v. Lewis, 473
A.2d 805, 815 (Del. 1984).
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such that “their discretion would be sterilized”218 or that they “are
incapable of making an impartial decision.”219 As the Delaware
Supreme Court recently put it, “[t]he court must conclude that the
director in question had ties to the person whose proposal or
actions he or she is evaluating that are sufficiently substantial that
he or she could not objectively discharge his or her fiduciary
duties.”220 These detailed requirements are much more lenient for
directors than the standard suggested by the definition of
independence, which would seem to require affirmative evidence
that “the director’s decision is based entirely on the corporate
merits of the transaction and is not influenced by personal or
extraneous considerations.”221 In a sense, then, independence is
little more than a test of indirect interest.
To be sure, the independence inquiry is applied on top of the
disinterestedness inquiry, and therefore expands the scope of the
duty of loyalty. The courts deserve credit for making this second
inquiry. However, in practice, the extension is not nearly as great
as it might seem to be. The courts continue to acknowledge too few
circumstances that may compromise independence, and demand
much too much evidence of such compromise, to make the inquiry
into independence very helpful.
C. Capacious Duty of Loyalty
Arguably, something more is happening in corporate law
theory. It seems that there may be an inchoate understanding that
the duty of loyalty is, or at least should be, much broader than
traditional concepts allow. Courts and scholars are increasingly
recognizing that directors may be influenced by forces other than
money and power, and that loyalty demands more than just the
avoidance of conflicts. If so, then there may be promise for a
brighter future for a robust duty of loyalty. However, it is not at all
clear that any such movement is afoot.
What is the evidence? One could point to developments such
218. Rales, 634 A.2d at 936.
219. Id. at 932.
220. Kahn v. M & F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635, 649 (Del. 2014).
221. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 362 (Del. 1993); supra note
204 and accompanying text.
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as independence review and the various intermediate standards of
review as nascent attempts to effectuate this broader view of the
duty of loyalty.222 In each case, the courts were trying to extend the
reach of the duty of loyalty beyond direct financial conflicts. While
these developments have certainly helped, we have seen that they
have had only limited success.223
Another, clearer manifestation of this development was the
holding, in Stone v. Ritter,224 that loyalty is not limited to financial
conflicts, but extends to actions not taken in good faith.225 This
holding might seem to presage a new era with a more expansive
understanding of the duty of loyalty.226 However, further reflection
shows that the holding is not particularly impressive for at least
two reasons.
First, the standard of review for bad faith requires the plaintiff
to establish intentional misconduct of some sort.227 This can take
many forms,228 including dereliction of duty,229 but it must be
222. Supra Part IV.A.
223. Supra Part IV.B.
224. 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006).
225. See id. at 370 (“[T]he fiduciary duty of loyalty is not limited to cases
involving a financial or other cognizable fiduciary conflict of interest. It also
encompasses cases where the fiduciary fails to act in good faith.”).
226. See, e.g., Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell, Stone v. Ritter and the
Expanding Duty of Loyalty, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1769, 1778 (2007) (noting that
one “consequence [of Stone] is the widening of the duty of loyalty. No longer is
loyalty only about ‘financial or other cognizable fiduciary conflict of interest.’ It
also includes good faith”); Andrew S. Gold, A Decision Theory Approach to the
Business Judgment Rule: Reflections on Disney, Good Faith, and Judicial
Uncertainty, 66 MD. L. REV. 398, 474 n.42 (2007) (“The Delaware Supreme Court’s
recent Stone decision clarifies that bad faith claims implicate a more expansive
view of the duty of loyalty.”).
227. See Velasco, supra note 2, at 1250 (describing “intentional misconduct”
as “intentional behavior that the law considers to be misconduct”).
228. See Stone, 911 A.2d at 369
A failure to act in good faith may be shown, for instance, where the
fiduciary intentionally acts with a purpose other than that of
advancing the best interests of the corporation, where the fiduciary
acts with the intent to violate applicable positive law, or where the
fiduciary intentionally fails to act in the face of a known duty to act,
demonstrating a conscious disregard for his duties. There may be other
examples of bad faith yet to be proven or alleged, but these three are
the most salient.
(quoting In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 67 (Del. 2006)).
229. See id. at 370 (“Where directors fail to act in the face of a known duty to
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“more culpable than . . . the conduct giving rise to a violation of the
fiduciary duty of care (i.e., gross negligence),”230 and “requires a
showing that the directors knew that they were not discharging
their fiduciary obligations.”231 This standard of review is extremely
demanding of the plaintiff and deferential to the defendant, and
presents a very high obstacle to any actual enforcement of
fiduciary duties.
Second, and more importantly, Stone added little, if anything,
to the law of fiduciary duties. The Delaware Supreme Court had
already begun to flesh out the standards for good faith in In re Walt
Disney Co. Derivative Litigation.232 What did Stone offer? A
reconceptualization. Prior to Stone, there was a triad of fiduciary
duties—care, loyalty, and good faith;233 after Stone, there were only
two fiduciary duties—care and loyalty, with good faith being
subsumed into loyalty.234 Despite the rhetoric to the contrary,
Stone offered no substantive improvement for shareholders; it
merely juggled a few labels.
Perhaps the most promising possibility of a future revival of
the duty of loyalty comes from the expressions of members of the
judiciary, both in dicta and in extra-judicial scholarship, that the
duty of loyalty may be greater than we think. A perfect example
can be found in the Disney case, where the court made the
following observation:
[T]he universe of fiduciary misconduct is not limited to either
disloyalty in the classic sense (i.e., preferring the adverse
self-interest of the fiduciary or of a related person to the interest
act, thereby demonstrating a conscious disregard for their responsibilities, they
breach their duty of loyalty by failing to discharge that fiduciary obligation in
good faith.”).
230. Id. at 369 (citing In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 66
(Del. 2006)).
231. Id. at 370.
232. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 66 (Del. 2006); supra
note 228 (quoting In re Walt Disney Co., Derivative Litig. 906 A.2d 27, 67 (Del.
2006)).
233. See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993) (“[A]
shareholder plaintiff assumes the burden of providing evidence that
directors . . . breached any one of the triads of their fiduciary dutygood faith,
loyalty, or due care.”).
234. See Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006) (characterizing good
faith as a “subsidiary element” within the fiduciary duty of loyalty).
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of the corporation) or gross negligence. Cases have arisen where
corporate directors have no conflicting self-interest in a
decision, yet engage in misconduct that is more culpable than
simple inattention or failure to be informed of all facts material
to the decision. To protect the interests of the corporation and
its shareholders, fiduciary conduct of this kind, which does not
involve disloyalty (as traditionally defined) but is qualitatively
more culpable than gross negligence, should be proscribed.235

Lofty language such as this certainly seems to aspire to great
things. However, in that case, the court settled upon the duty to
act in good faith as the vehicle to address the violations at hand.236
Similar language can be found sprinkled throughout the law
reports. Among my personal favorites are the following two
passages. The first is an often-cited gem by former Chancellor
Allen: “Greed is not the only human emotion that can pull one from
the path of propriety; so might hatred, lust, envy,
revenge, . . . shame or pride. Indeed any human emotion may
cause a director to place his own interests, preferences or appetites
before the welfare of the corporation.”237 The second is a similar
passage by then Vice Chancellor Strine:
Delaware law should not be based on a reductionist view of
human nature that simplifies human motivations on the lines
of the least sophisticated notions of the law and economics
movement. Homo sapiens is not merely homo economicus. We
may be thankful that an array of other motivations exist that
influence human behavior; not all are any better than greed or
avarice, think of envy, to name just one. But also think of
motives like love, friendship, and collegiality, think of those
among us who direct their behavior as best they can on a
guiding creed or set of moral values.238

When writing or citing passages such as these, courts are implicitly
acknowledging the need for a more comprehensive inquiry into
loyalty than current law allows. And yet, we are where we are—
which, as I have argued throughout this article, is not where we
235. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 66 (Del. 1993).
236. See id. (“A vehicle is needed to address such violation doctrinally, and
that doctrinal vehicle is the duty to act in good faith.”).
237. In re RJR Nabisco, Inc. S’holders Litig., No. 10389, 1989 WL 7036, at *15
(Del. Ch. Jan. 31, 1989) (Allen, C.). This passage is especially well-cited for what
is ostensibly an unpublished opinion.
238. In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d 917, 938 (Del. Ch. 2003).
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seem to think we should be. Perhaps the courts are simply content
to act “more as preachers than as policemen.”239 If so, then hope for
legal change is misplaced.
On the other hand, perhaps there is some hope after all. The
elevation of Leo Strine from Vice Chancellor to Chancellor and
then to Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court is not
insignificant. Throughout his judicial career, Strine has been more
receptive to softer loyalty claims, such as structural bias, than
many of his colleagues. He is now in a position to have a major
influence on corporate law. Perhaps his loyalty-friendly views will
find their way into Delaware jurisprudence.
Insight into Strine’s views on the duty of loyalty can be found
in a law review article that he co-authored, entitled Loyalty’s Core
Demand.240 There, he forcefully articulates capacious
understanding of the duty of loyalty that “emphasizes not only the
obligation of a loyal fiduciary to refrain from advantaging herself
at the expense of the corporation but, just as importantly, to act
affirmatively to further the corporation’s best interests.”241 The
breadth of this view can be seen in his claims that “the duty of
loyalty is implicated by all director actions”242 and that “it is
possible to conceive of there being only one core [fiduciary] duty,
that of loyalty, and that the duty of care is itself simply a
component of what is expected of a faithful—that is, loyal—
fiduciary.”243 As for the prominence that financial conflicts have
enjoyed in loyalty jurisprudence, Strine “acknowledge[s] that the
duty of loyalty remains. . . . most difficult to apply to
circumstances when directors act without an apparent selfish
interest to injure the corporation.”244 However, he treats this as a
bug, rather than a feature, of the duty of loyalty. To be fair, the
article is concerned primarily with defending the holding of Stone
v. Ritter and not with expanding loyalty beyond good faith.
However, the seeds for greater expansion arguably are present.
239. Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law
Work?, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1009, 1016 (1997).
240. Strine et al., supra note 53. For the sake of simplicity, I will refer only to
Strine, and not his coauthors, when discussing this article.
241. Id. at 634.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 635.
244. Id. at 634.
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But, is Strine a policeman, or is he content to be a preacher?
There are cases that suggest that he may be willing to decide cases
consistent with his theories. Two cases in particular come to mind.
The first example is the Oracle245 case. In that case, plaintiffs
were pursuing derivative litigation against the directors of the
company (the Trading Defendants).246 Oracle created a special
litigation committee (SLC) to decide whether derivative litigation
should be dismissed.247 The company appointed two new board
members, both of whom were tenured faculty members at Stanford
University, to comprise the SLC.248 After an investigation that
was, “by any objective measure, extensive,”249 the committee
concluded that the litigation should be dismissed.250 The question
was whether their decision should be respected.251 Strine
conclude[d] that the SLC [had] not met its burden to show the
absence of a material factual question about its
independence . . . because the ties among the SLC, the Trading
Defendants, and Stanford [we]re so substantial that they
cause[d] reasonable doubt about the SLC’s ability to impartially
consider whether the Trading Defendants should face suit.252

The problem was that the Trading Directors were “a fellow
professor and two large benefactors of their university.”253
In order to understand the significance of the holding, one
needs to contextualize the facts. The financial ties between the
Trading Defendants and the SLC members were indirect at best,
with the former representing donors and potential donors of
Stanford University, where the latter were employed.254 The court
acknowledged that neither SLC member “ha[d] fundraising
responsibilities at Stanford.”255 Moreover, the Trading Defendant
245. In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d 917 (Del. Ch. 2003).
246. Id. at 922.
247. Id. at 923.
248. Id. at 923–24.
249. Id. at 925.
250. Id. at 928.
251. Id. at 920.
252. Id. at 942.
253. Id. at 921.
254. See id. at 920–21 (describing the financial ties between the defendants
and committee members).
255. Id. at 936.
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who was a fellow professor “was in a different academic
department from either SLC member.”256 The most that could be
said of the relationship between the professor defendant and one
of the SLC members was that the former “was a professor who had
taught [the latter] and with whom he had maintained contact over
the years.”257 This is not exactly evidence of a close friendship.
As for the SLC members’ independence, the court
acknowledged that “neither of the SLC members is compromised
by a fear that support for the procession of this suit would
endanger his ability to make a nice living.”258 In fact, Strine
admitted that “[n]othing in the record suggest[ed] . . . that either
[SLC member was] dominated and controlled by any of the Trading
Defendants, by Oracle, or even by Stanford.”259 Although that is
ordinarily considered the appropriate criteria,260 Strine sought to
move the needle beyond those limitations.261 He was not convinced
of the SLC members’ independence, even though one imagines that
many of his judicial colleagues would be. Chief Justice Veasey, for
example, found the directors in Beam v. Stewart262 to be
independent despite what seemed to be considerably stronger ties
to the defendant.263 Although one could distinguish the cases based
on who bears the burden of proof, as Veasey tries to do, it seems
that he is not entirely convinced.264 In any event, Strine’s views on
independence, friendship, and structural bias are undeniably quite
256. Id. at 942.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 930.
259. Id. at 937.
260. See supra notes 215–221 and accompanying text (discussing the
standard for independence).
261. See In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d 917, 937 (Del. Ch. 2003)
(“But, in my view, an emphasis on ‘domination and control’ would serve only to
fetishize much-parroted language, at the cost of denuding the independence
inquiry of its intellectual integrity.”); see also supra note 237 and accompanying
text (discussing various factors that could compromise a director’s independence).
262. 845 A.2d 1040 (Del. 2004).
263. For a discussion of the case, see supra notes 205–214 and accompanying
text.
264. See Stewart, 845 A.2d at 1054–55 (“We need not decide whether the
substantive standard of independence in a SLC case differs from that in a presuit
demand case. As a practical matter, the procedural distinction relating to the
diametrically-opposed burdens . . . may be outcome determinative on the issue of
independence.”).
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different than Veasey’s, and this could be expected to lead to very
different outcomes in actual cases.
A second, more recent example can be found in Delaware
County Employees Retirement Fund v. Sanchez.265 That was
another independence case. Strine, now Chief Justice, held that
the long-term friendship in that case, at least when joined with
strong financial ties, could compromise director independence.266
This is a promising development after the Stewart case. However,
not too much should be made of the Sanchez opinion. As skeptical
as the Stewart court seemed of structural bias, the opinion in that
case had acknowledged that “a particularly close or intimate”
friendship could compromise director independence.267 The
relationship in the Sanchez case had spanned over fifty years!268
Arguably, the two cases are perfectly compatible. Thus, Sanchez
cannot fairly be said to rewrite the law of independence in the way
that Oracle might have. Nevertheless, it is a positive development
to see Strine so quickly hold what Veasey would only say was
theoretically possible.
As welcome as these cases may be, they are not
game-changing. They are not enough to establish that a revolution
is on its way. In fact, one should not forget that Strine also
proposed the test that was eventually adopted in the M & F
Worldwide case, which gave controlling shareholders access to the
business judgment rule.269 Arguably, this is a more distressing
development for loyalty advocates than the Oracle and Sanchez
265. Del. Cty. Emps. Ret. Fund v. Sanchez, 124 A.3d 1017 (Del. 2015).
266. See id. at 1019 (“[N]ot only that the director [did have] a close friendship
of over half a century with the interested party, but that consistent with that deep
friendship, the director’s primary employment . . . was as an executive of a
company over which the interested party had substantial influence.”).
267. See Stewart, 845 A.2d at 105052 (describing that a close personal
relationship will be considered in the calculus, but “substantially more” must
accompany it).
268. See Sanchez, 124 A.3d at 1023 (“[T]here arises a pleading stage inference
that Jackson’s economic positions derive in large measure from his 50-year close
friendship with Chairman Sanchez . . . .”).
269. Supra notes 94–95 and accompanying text. Strine proposed this test in
In re Cox Commc’ns Inc. S’holders Litig., 879 A.2d 604, 606, 643–45 (Del. Ch.
2005). Also worth mentioning is Strine’s authorship of the opinion in Corwin v.
KKR Financial Holdings LLC, 125 A.3d 304 (Del. 2015), which strongly endorsed
the application of the business judgment rule after a shareholder vote, rejecting
the plaintiffs’ argument that there was a de facto controlling interest.
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cases are promising. Therefore, although one might not be
considered foolish for holding out hope, it does not seem fair to say
that a more capacious duty of loyalty has gained any real traction
as of yet.
V. The Way Forward
In this Article, I have sought to demonstrate that the
corporate law duty of loyalty is significantly weaker than is
generally appreciated. I listed various developments that have cut
back on its enforcement significantly, and then argued that other
developments that might have mitigated these effects have not
lived up to their potential. As a result, we are left with a severely
diminished duty of loyalty.
I do not mean to suggest that these developments have been
entirely misguided. I would readily concede that most of them are
justifiable—perhaps
even
desirable—when
considered
individually. Rather, my argument is that the accretion of various
restrictions has led to a situation in which enforcement of the duty
of loyalty is out of sync with corporate law theory and the
prevailing corporate law narrative. This should give us reason to
wonder whether we have reached a point that is suboptimal. It
certainly raises the question of what ought to be done about it.
In this Part, I will suggest there are three possible strategies.
First, the law could scale back on some of the developments in
order to achieve a more optimal balance.270 Second, the law could
keep the existing rules, but develop alternative solutions to help
mitigate their negative effects.271 Third, the law could do nothing
and accept the legal status quo.272 I will briefly address each of
these strategies, but I will not attempt to offer a comprehensive
solution. The point of this Article is to identify an inconsistency
between law and theory. A thorough reassessment of corporate law
and theory is called for, and that would be beyond the scope of this
Article. Ultimately, the way forward will depend more upon policy
choices than logic. If we accept the prevailing corporate law
270.
271.
272.

Infra Part V.A.
Infra Part V.B.
Infra Part V.C.
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narrative, then we should adopt some mix of the first and second
strategies in order to have the law reflect the theory. On the other
hand, if we accept the status quo, then we need to revise our
theories to explain corporate law.
A. Option 1: Scale Back
The first option would be to scale back on the various
developments discussed in Part III. A radical revision or wholesale
repeal of modern developments may not be necessary. Proceeding
under the assumption that each individual development was
justified but the aggregate effect is excessive, it would seem that a
more modest scaling back, or tweaking of the rules, would be
appropriate.
Legal reform could take different approaches. It could
concentrate on eliminating rules that are particularly detrimental.
Alternatively, it could focus on scaling back various rules to
achieve a better equilibrium. Of course, a combination of the two
strategies might be the best approach. There is no obviously
superior path. Although a specific proposal would be beyond the
scope of this Article, I would like to offer some thoughts on the
matter.
Any legal reform in this area should be based on a cost-benefit
analysis. An important aspect of such an analysis would be to
weigh the risk of Type I errors (false positives) against that of Type
II errors (false negatives) in litigation.273 The meaning of false
negative is fairly clear: restrictions on enforcement increase the
risk that breaches of duty will be permitted. The meaning of false
positive is a bit more complicated: allowing more enforcement
actions not only increases the risk of finding a breach of duty where
there is none, but also increases litigation costs in the absence of
breach and causes some businesses to forego positive opportunities
for fear of litigation.
273. See generally Kenneth B. Davis, Judicial Review of Fiduciary
Decisionmaking—Some Theoretical Perspectives, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 1 (1986); Lynn
A. Stout, Type I Error, Type II Error, and the Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 711 (1996). False negatives and false positives have not been
labeled consistently in the literature. I have chosen to use Professor Stout’s
convention of referring to false positives as Type I errors and false negatives as
Type II errors.
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Ideally, we would want to minimize the aggregate costs of all
errors.274 However, it is not easy to get precise estimates of these
costs. In the absence of reliable data, it may be wise to seek
reasonable alternatives. For example, it may be advisable to
concentrate on reforming rules that add the greatest costs or the
least value, or those rules that would be easiest to change and offer
reasonable potential.
A thorough cost-benefit analysis would be complicated by the
necessity of factoring in the cross-effects that the various rules
have on one another. By way of illustration, I will explore
exculpation provisions. These are charter provisions that limit or
eliminate director liability for monetary damages for breaches of
the duty of care.275 Although exculpation provisions do not apply to
breaches of the duty of loyalty, they can demonstrate the impact of
seemingly unrelated developments.
Exculpation provisions were born out of a Type I error crisis.
In Smith v. Van Gorkom,276 the Delaware Supreme Court held the
directors liable for breach of the duty of care under circumstances
that many would not even consider ordinary negligence, much less
gross negligence.277 That decision undermined confidence in the
deference offered by the business judgment rule, and some sought
a means to do away with liability for breach of the duty of care
altogether. In order to eliminate the risk of false positives,
legislators were willing to accept the cost of all false negatives.
That was not necessarily a mistake, but the decision is striking
enough to give one pause. The cost of Type II errors would have to
be quite high to outweigh the full cost of Type I errors in every
274. Cf. Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Bad Arguments in Corporate Law, 78 GEO.
L.J. 1551, 1553 (1990) (“Unlike the social sciences . . . in applied enterprises the
costs of a Type I error may be just as great or greater than the costs of a Type II
error.”). But see Davis, supra note 273, at 29 (“[I]f the fiduciary is in a better
position to obtain compensation for the risk of Type II error than the principal is
in to obtain compensation for the risk of Type I error, rule B might be the ‘better’
rule, despite the greater aggregate amount of error.”).
275. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (West 2017); MODEL BUS.
CORP. ACT ANN. § 2.02(b)(4) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1969).
276. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
277. See Velasco, supra note 8, at 658 (“Although the Supreme Court
reaffirmed that the standard of review was gross negligence, they held directors
liable under circumstances that many people did not believe amounted to gross
negligence, and some thought did not even amount to simple negligence.”).
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meritorious case. This is especially so because the business
judgment rule already provided very strong protection against
false positives.278 The added protection of an exculpation provision
was likely quite minimal, and therefore not obviously worth the
cost of preventing recovery in all meritorious cases.279
It may be that exculpation makes sense in duty of care cases.
However, it is far less likely to make sense in duty of loyalty cases.
That is because self-dealing is potentially so very lucrative for a
fiduciary. This much is easily understood. What is less often
appreciated is the impact of exculpation provisions on loyalty
cases. Because of exculpation, there is little to no risk of Type I
errors for care cases. Thus, the justification for the restrictions on
derivative litigation must be based almost entirely on the risk of
Type I errors in loyalty cases. It seems difficult to imagine that the
cost-benefit analysis does not at least change dramatically when
care cases are eliminated.
This suggests that a reassessment of the restrictions on
derivative litigation would have been appropriate after the
widespread acceptance of exculpation provisions. However, such a
reassessment never occurred. Exculpation provisions were simply
accepted over and above all previous developments. While a careful
review might show that this was ultimately appropriate, that
seems unlikely if things were otherwise previously in balance. At
the very least, this example illustrates how new developments
could have significant ramifications beyond their immediate scope
and therefore should be evaluated not simply on their own merits,
but also in relation to the entire constellation of rules that make
up corporate law. Alternatively, periodic reassessment of the
overall situation would be appropriate.
Keeping in mind that the goal of this section is only to present
the option of scaling back and not to recommend a specific course
of action, it seems possible to venture guesses as to which types of
reforms are more promising than others. Thus, for example, I will
suggest that corporate law would be less willing to scale back on
disinterested review or the demand requirement than it would be
278. See supra notes 47–52 and accompanying text (discussing the protection
offered by the business judgment rule).
279. One should also factor in the possibility that directors, once they know
they are entirely free of liability for breach of the duty of care, may be more likely
to be negligent than they would have been if there were a risk of liability.
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to revitalize the entire fairness test. In the remainder of this
section, I will survey the various types of developments considered
in Part III.
The first set of developments involved the approval of
conflicted transactions by disinterested directors.280 These rules
could be scaled back in different ways. An extreme reform could
reject the cleansing power of disinterested director approval; a
more moderate reform could reduce the cleansing power of such
approval.281 The strongest theoretical argument in favor of such
reforms is that they directly tackle an important problem—that of
structural bias, which undermines confidence in directors which is
the prerequisite for the deference of the business judgment rule.282
Moreover, it is worth noting that such reforms would not be
entirely revolutionary, but simply would amount to turning back
the clock and returning to earlier policies.283
It is not obvious how a cost-benefit analysis would come out.
Not allowing disinterested directors to sanitize conflicted
transactions could lead to a great deal of litigation, which could
mean a huge increase in Type I errors. However, it could also lead
to a great reduction in conflicted transactions. This would reduce
Type II errors, but possibly increase Type I errors in the form of
positive opportunities foregone. These are empirical questions;
theory cannot provide answers.
Nevertheless, it seems that this type of reform would not gain
much traction. It would fly in the face of modern trends. The heart
of corporate law theory is that conflicts should be decided by
neutral arbiters,284 and one of the main themes of modern theory
is that unconflicted directors can be neutral arbiters.285 In fact,
280. See supra Part III.A (discussing the development of disinterested review
to deal with the duty of loyalty).
281. A related proposal would be to expand what counts as an “interest,” and
thereby tighten the disinterestedness requirement. However, that is essentially
the role of the independence inquiry, which is considered separately. For an
example, see infra notes 300–301 and accompanying text.
282. See supra notes 96–99 and accompanying text (discussing structural
bias).
283. See supra note 25 and accompanying text (summarizing Professor
Marsh’s history of the development of the duty of loyalty between 1880 and 1960).
284. See supra notes 70–73 and accompanying text (explaining the need for
an independent decision maker).
285. See generally supra Part III.A.
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unconflicted directors are preferable to judges because judges are
not business experts.286 Thus, both state and federal law has
concentrated on ensuring that disinterested directors be neutral
arbiters rather than on denying that they can be.287 Even if one is
convinced about the merits of scaling back on disinterested
approvals, it seems overly-optimistic to expect the law to reverse
course on such a fundamental question. Thus, this does not seem
to be a promising option.
The second category of potential reforms is the cognizability of
conflicts for duty of loyalty purposes.288 Currently, only personal or
familial financial conflicts that are material are deemed to rise to
the level of self-dealing count.289 This could be scaled back in a
number of ways. For example, the materiality standard could be
eliminated or lowered so that less significant financial conflict
would be captured. Alternatively, important non-financial
conflicts, such as those involving extended family members or close
friends or important causes, could be recognized as raising loyalty
issues.
This seems to be a more promising avenue for reform. After
all, the restrictions seem to be based more on practical business
considerations than on fiduciary law principles. Therefore,
compromise seems both more reasonable and more achievable.
Moreover, expanding the scope of cognizability could be done in a
very moderate way that need not upset the fabric of corporate law.
For example, the materiality standard, which is arguably quite
high, could be lowered to something closer to a de minimis
exception: insignificant amounts could be ignored, while
significant amounts would matter even if they would not qualify
as material to the director. After all, people are known to
sometimes do foolish things for relatively small amounts of money.
286. See Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Governance Movement, 35 VAND. L.
REV. 1259, 1288 (1982) (“There is no reason to believe that courts can
systematically improve on the business decisions made by corporate managers.”);
see also Velasco, supra note 8, at 660–61 (discussing judicial incompetence).
287. See, e.g., Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 § 301, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1 (2012);
Dodd–Frank Act of 2010 § 952, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-3 (2012); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 144 (West 2017); see also N. Y. Stock Exch., Inc., Exchange Act Release No.
34-48745, 81 SEC Docket 1586 (Nov. 4, 2003) (describing exchange listing rules).
288. See generally supra Part III.B.
289. See supra Part III.B (analyzing which types of conflicts of interests are
cognizable).
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Consider Martha Stewart, who was embroiled in an insider trading
scandal and convicted of making false statements to investigators,
all regarding a sale of approximately $230,000 worth of stock—an
amount that is not insignificant, but one that would not be
considered material relative to her fortune.290 In a similar manner,
one could reasonably maintain friendship is such a powerful force
that people might do things for friends that they would not do for
money.291 Thus, strong affinities could compromise confidence in
director’s objectivity sufficiently to rebut the presumption of the
business judgment rule.
Drawing lines would be difficult, but should not be impossible.
The cost-benefit analysis would depend entirely on where those
lines are drawn. There is no reason to assume that the status quo
has achieved the optimal balance. However, it seems unlikely that
the ideal point is very far from the status quo. Extending the scope
of enforcement too far along these lines would likely lead to huge
increases in Type I costs—or, at least, one could easily imagine.
Thus, it would be prudent to move slowly on this front.
A third category of potential reform would involve
strengthening the entire fairness test. As previously discussed,
corporate law seems to be moving from a form of strict scrutiny to
a more relaxed test that aspires only to a range of fairness.292
Reform would involve reverting to a more rigorous form of judicial
review, in which there is less room for error and doubts are
resolved in favor of the shareholders.
This seems to be the most promising avenue for reform. In the
first place, the relaxation of the fairness test is still underway, and
much less established than the other developments.293 Reform is
290. See United States v. Stewart, 433 F.3d 273, 283 (2d Cir. 2006) (“Stewart’s
ImClone sell order . . . yield[ed] proceeds of approximately $230,000.”).
291. See Velasco, supra note 7, at 859 n.157 (discussing incommensurability
of friendship and money) (citing Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and
Valuation in Law, 92 MICH. L. REV. 779, 785–86 (1994)); see also Antony Page,
Unconscious Bias and the Limits of Director Independence, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV.
237, 239 (2009) (“[D]irectors may in some circumstances be systematically biased
for many other reasons besides family and finance. It will come as no surprise
that people are also biased by group loyalties, friendship, and nonpecuniary
self-interest.”).
292. See generally supra notes 120–124 and accompanying text.
293. See generally supra Part III.C. It is not clear that the courts would even
acknowledge that the “range of fairness” is different than “entire fairness.”

DUTY OF LOYALTY

1087

likely to be less painful. Moreover, a cost-benefit analysis is likely
to be supportive. The costs of Type I errors are relatively low by
the time the entire fairness test comes into play. By that point,
there is a well pleaded case of self-dealing and a trial already
underway. It would at most be suboptimal, but not a true injustice,
to rule against the transaction that arguably might better have
been forbidden altogether. By comparison, the costs of Type II
errors are quite high at this point: the possibility of disloyal
conduct that goes undetected is likely at its zenith.
Moreover, such reform would resonate well with corporate law
theory. The extreme deference of the business judgment rule that
is given to directors when they can be trusted ought to be balanced
by a rigorous entire fairness test when directors cannot be
trusted.294 This would seem, then, to be the low-hanging fruit of
possible reforms.
The fourth category of reform would be the standing rules for
maintaining derivative litigation.295 Because there are so many
restrictions, there are a wide range of potential reforms. Reform
could target, for example, the contemporaneous ownership rule,
the demand requirement itself, the particularity requirement,
access to information or discovery, the waiver rules, or special
litigation committees.296 Any or all of them could be eliminated, or
merely scaled back.
A cost-benefit analysis on this front would be a tremendous
undertaking. Nevertheless, a few general observations are
possible. It seems that the demand requirement may be too
integral to the courts’ understanding of corporate law theory to be
eliminated or radically revised. Moreover, eliminating the demand
requirement would not eliminate the need for demand futility
analysis: it might be restyled as the standard of review for
derivative litigation, but the need to decide when shareholders are
permitted to bring such an action would not change. By
comparison, lowering the burden of the particularity requirement
294. See supra Part II.B (discussing the prevailing corporate law narrative).
295. See generally supra Part III.D.
296. See, e.g., supra notes 137–141 and accompanying text (discussing the
contemporaneous ownership rule); supra notes 142–146 and accompanying text
(discussing the demand requirement); supra notes 147–148 (describing the
particularity requirement); supra notes 149–151 and accompanying text (noting
other difficulties in bringing derivative actions).
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and increasing plaintiffs’ access to information should be less
problematic. It may well be possible to scale back on these rules in
ways that would not allow the costs of Type I errors to swamp the
benefits of reducing Type II errors. Moderate moves along these
lines might do more good than harm.
The final category of reform would involve corporate
opportunity waivers.297 Such laws could be repealed altogether.
Alternatively, they could be scaled back to require shareholder
approval, whether by charter amendment or shareholder-adopted
bylaw.298 However, the empirical evidence does not suggest that
reform is necessary.299 The reasons for doing so are based in theory
and principle. It seems implausible to expect reform on this basis
alone.
I would like to offer one final thought on the option of scaling
back. After a thorough reassessment of the legal landscape, and a
careful weighing of the various costs and benefits, it may be
decided that scaling back on modern developments is not
appropriate after all. Nevertheless, the foregoing discussion could
inform future developments of law. Even if we decide not to reverse
any of the developments, we could decide to stop, or at least scale
back the rate of, future changes along the same lines. If nothing
else, this section should suggest that future changes ought to be
evaluated not only on their own merits, but also on the overall
effect they will have on corporate law.
B. Option 2: Balance
One way to respond to the diminishing duty of loyalty is to
scale back on modern developments, as discussed in the previous
section. A second approach would be to pursue alternative

297. See generally supra Part III.E.
298. Requiring a shareholder-adopted bylaw might be preferable. If waiver
requires a charter amendment, then repeal of the waiver would also require a
charter amendment. It might be difficult to get directors to agree to such a repeal.
Cf. Velasco, supra note 8, at 659 (making similar argument with respect to
exculpation provisions).
299. See supra note 168 and accompanying text (highlighting empirical
evidence that suggests that widespread use of corporate opportunity waivers may
not be harmful to shareholders).
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strategies for mitigating the situation. This section will briefly
consider some of the possibilities.
Perhaps the obvious choice would be to work with strategies
that have already been attempted. Part IV considered some of
these: intermediate standards of review and independence review.
Such strategies could fairly easily be revitalized to produce
stronger results. This would not necessarily even require rewriting
much case law. To employ the language of Delaware Chief Justice
Strine, employing a “gimlet eye”300 or a different “flavoring”301
might be sufficient to effect the appropriate change. In other
words, existing tests could help mitigate the situation if only they
were applied with greater sympathy for loyalty concerns.
I believe that improving the intermediate standards of review
and independence review would be excellent ways to deal with the
concerns raised in this Article. Thus, in previous work, I have
argued for a unified intermediate standard of review for dealing
with issues of structural bias.302 Nevertheless, I will not spend
much time on these strategies for two reasons. First, such reforms
are relatively straightforward and, for present purposes, require
little elaboration. Second, there is reason to question their
ultimate success. If these developments failed to live up to their
full potential the first time, there is reason doubt whether they
would have a lasting impact on a second attempt. Courts seem to
have difficulty with muscular intermediate standards of review
and with taking on structural bias. If so, then it might be better to
pursue alternative strategies for meaningful reform.
300. Chesapeake Corp. v. Shore, 771 A.2d 293, 323 (Del. Ch. 2000). As Strine
explained:
If Unocal is applied by the court with a gimlet eye out for inequitably
motivated electoral manipulations or for subjectively well-intentioned
board action that has preclusive or coercive effects, the need for an
additional standard of review is substantially lessened. Stated
differently, it may be optimal simply for Delaware courts to infuse our
Unocal analyses with the spirit animating Blasius and not hesitate to
use our remedial powers where an inequitable distortion of corporate
democracy has occurred.
Id.; see also William T. Allen et al., Function Over Form: A Reassessment of
Standards of Review in Delaware Corporation Law, 56 BUS. LAW. 1287, 1316
(2001) (same) (quoting Chesapeake Corp., 771 A.2d at 323).
301. Allen et al., supra note 300, at 1315.
302. See Velasco, supra note 7, at 870–83 (discussing the limits of director
independence).
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Another possibility for dealing with a diminished duty of
loyalty would be to strengthen its counterpart, the duty of care.
The duty of care is an important, but under-enforced fiduciary
duty.303 Courts often suggest that the deference of the business
judgment rule makes sense because unconflicted directors can be
trusted.304 If the duty of loyalty adequately weeded out conflicts of
interest, that might well be so. But if the duty of loyalty fails to do
so adequately, then we cannot justify so much deference. As I have
argued in the past, “the fact that a shareholder cannot establish
self-dealing does not mean that directors were not conflicted[.]”305
The upshot of all the developments in Part III is that judicial
failure to find a breach of the duty of loyalty is no guarantee that
there has not been such a breach. Thus, the need for enforcement
of the duty of care remains. This does not mean that strict
enforcement is appropriate, but it does suggest that no
enforcement may be inappropriate.
How could the duty of care be strengthened? One possibility
would be to eliminate exculpation provisions. Exculpation
provisions relieve directors of any possibility of liability for
breaches of the duty of care.306 Eliminating them would not be so
radical as it might seem, because the business judgment rule
would remain. The business judgment rule shields directors from
liability for breaches of duty of care in all but the most extreme
circumstances.307 Directors are not liable for negligence or
unreasonableness, but only for gross negligence and
irrationality.308 In fact, very few cases exist in which directors have
been held liable under these standards.309 Thus, eliminating
303. See Velasco, supra note 8, at 648 (describing “the duty of care as it
currently exists in corporate law” as “deliberately and advisedly underenforced,
but not entirely unenforced”); see also Julian Velasco, The Role of Aspiration in
Corporate Fiduciary Duties, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 519, 580–85 (2012)
(discussing the concept of the underenforced duty).
304. See generally supra notes 7, 70–73 and accompanying text.
305. Velasco, supra note 2, at 1255.
306. See generally supra note 275 and accompanying text.
307. See generally supra notes 47–52 and accompanying text.
308. See generally supra notes 50–51 and accompanying text.
309. See, e.g., Joseph W. Bishop, Sitting Ducks and Decoy Duck: New Trends
in the Identification of Corporate Directors and Officers, 77 YALE L.J. 1078, 1099–
1100 (1968) (noting four examples “based on extensive (although not exhaustive)
investigation”); Stuart R. Cohn, Demise of the Director’s Duty of Care: Judicial
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exculpation provisions and reverting to the business judgment rule
would have only a minor effect on actual litigation outcomes.
However, by restoring the theoretical possibility of liability, it
could have a real effect on director behavior.310
Admittedly, elimination of exculpation provisions is highly
unlikely. Not only are they ubiquitous, but in addition there is no
strong push for repeal.311 Nevertheless, complete repeal is not the
only option. The duty of care could be strengthened by making it
easier for exculpation provisions to be repealed. Generally,
exculpation provisions reside in the corporate charter.312 They can
be repealed, but that requires a charter amendment. Shareholders
cannot amend charters on their own; the approval of both the
shareholders and the directors is required.313 Directors are
unlikely to vote in favor increasing their potential liability. Thus,
exculpation provisions are effectively locked into the corporate
governance system. To make them easier to repeal, the law could
provide that exculpation provisions could be adopted and repealed
by shareholder-enacted bylaw.
There is no reason to believe that this would result in a mass
repeal of exculpation provisions. Shareholders seem to be aware of
the risks that would be entailed by repeal. Moreover, it is not very
easy for shareholders to coordinate on action to amend bylaws.314
By comparison, if a mistake were made, it would be relatively easy,
as a procedural matter at least, for directors to get shareholders to
Avoidance of Standards and Sanctions Through the Business Judgment Rule, 62
TEX. L. REV. 591, 591 n.1 (1983) (collecting seven cases); see also RADIN, supra
note 88, at 498–503 (discussing fourteen cases).
310. Cf. Velasco, supra note 8, at 663–66 (discussing extent of director risk
aversion).
311. See Edward Rock & Michael Wachter, Dangerous Liaisons: Corporate
Law, Trust Law, and Interdoctrinal Legal Transplants, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 651,
659–60 (2002) (discussing lack of interest in repeal of exculpation provisions). But
see Velasco, supra note 8, at 659 (discussing limits of Rock & Wacther’s
argument).
312. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (West 2017) (allowing charters
to include exculpation provisions).
313. See id. § 242 (outlining the charter amendment process).
314. See L. John Bird, Stockholder and Corporate Board Bylaw Battles:
Delaware Law and the Ability of a Corporate Board to Change or Overrule
Stockholder Bylaw Amendments, 2008 U. PENN. J. BUS. LAW 217, 235–36 (2008)
(discussing the difficulties shareholders face in amending corporate bylaws
including apathy and failure to collectively act).
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vote for the restoration of exculpation. Under these circumstances,
the flexibility would seem ideal. It would provide little more than
the threat of a threat of liability in most cases, while allowing
shareholders to choose to protect themselves with a stronger duty
of care if they deem it necessary.
Another possibility would be to increase shareholder voting
rights. This could be done in a myriad of ways. For example, the
number of issues on which shareholders are entitled to vote could
be increased. Unless the issues were carefully chosen, however,
this could easily slide into a shareholder rights issue (to increase
shareholder power generally) rather than a duty of loyalty issue
(to deal with conflicts specifically). In order to preserve the
prerogative of un-conflicted directors to manage the business and
affairs of the corporation, shareholders could be given extended
rights to vote only on conflicted transactions and other issues that
clearly implicate loyalty issues—an example of which might be
“say on pay.”315 Although this would entail transaction costs that
are not insignificant, it would enable shareholders to protect
themselves to the extent they wish to do so.
It may be that increasing shareholder voting rights would fail
a cost-benefit analysis. Alternatively, it might be thought to
undermine too much some of the key advantages of the corporate
form—the separation of ownership and management and the
benefits of expert management.316 However, substantive voting
rights are not the only way to increase shareholders’ ability to
protect themselves. Federal law has devised a number of
315. See Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub.
L. No. 111-203, § 951, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified at various sections of the
U.S.C.). Of course, even when limited to issues touching upon loyalty, shareholder
voice may have a significant impact on management decision making. Thus, for
example, executive compensation is a quintessential business decision. See
Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 263 (2000) (“[T]he size ad structure of executive
compensation are inherently matters of judgment.”).
316. Cf. Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Governance Movement, 35 VAND. L.
REV. 1259, 1276-77 (1982)
The genius of the modern corporation . . . is that it enables
individuals who have wealth but lack managerial ability to
invest while simultaneously allowing professional managers
who lack personal wealth to run enterprises. Shareholders
would be hurt rather than helped if they were given more power,
which no doubt explains why they show no enthusiasm for the
constant proposals to increase their role.
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interesting alternatives that could be incorporated in state law.
Using proxy rules as a model, for example, shareholders could be
given non-binding voting rights.317 Using Dodd–Frank as a model,
shareholders could be given the right to vote on whether their
voting rights should be extended.318 Other possibilities could be
imagined to achieve a proper balance.
A different approach would be to strengthen the shareholders’
existing right to vote for and against directors. Although it would
be controversial, such a move would fit in nicely with corporate
theory. 319 As the courts have often acknowledged, “[t]he
shareholder franchise is the ideological underpinning upon which
the legitimacy of directorial power rests.”320 Moreover, there have
been some movements along these lines, both in state law and
federal law.321 Of course, there are also valid objections to
strengthening shareholder voting power.322 But those concerns
317. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(1) (2017) (allowing shareholder proposals
that would otherwise be considered improper under state law to be included in
the company’s proxy materials if they are cast as recommendations or requests).
318. See id. § 14A(a)(2) (requiring a periodic shareholder vote to determine
the frequency of shareholder votes on executive compensation packages).
319. See Bo Becker & Guhan Subramanian, Improving Director Elections, 3
HARV. BUS. L. REV. 1, 21 (2013)
To disinterested observers, the idea that shareholders should be able
to put their own nominees on the company’s proxy statement might
seem to require no explanation. (As one prominent Delaware lawyer
put it to us, proxy access might even seem to be a property interest that
comes with share ownership.) Yet proxy access has been one of the
most controversial—if not the most controversial—issues in corporate
governance over the past decade.
320. Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659 (Del. Ch. 1988); see
also MM Cos. v. Liquid Audio, Inc., 813 A.2d 1118, 1126 (Del. 2003) (“[T]he
stockholder franchise has been characterized as the ‘ideological underpinning’
upon which the legitimacy of the directors managerial power rests.” (quoting
Blasius, 564 A.2d at 659)).
321. For an example from federal law, see supra note 318 and accompanying
text. For examples from state law, see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 112–113 (West
2017).
322. For a sampling of arguments against extending shareholder voting
power, see generally Iman Anabtawi, Some Skepticism About Increasing
Shareholder Power, 53 UCLA L. REV. 561 (2006); Stephen M. Bainbridge, The
Case for Limited Shareholder Voting Rights, 53 UCLA L. REV. 601 (2006); Leo E.
Strine, Towards a True Corporate Republic: A Traditionalist Response to
Bebchuk’s Solution for Improving Corporate America, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1759
(2006).
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should prompt us to act carefully, rather than to take voting rights
off the table entirely. For present purposes, it suffices to note that
stronger rights to elect and remove directors would empower
shareholders to engage in self-help and protect themselves from
the abuse at the hands of directors that could result from a
diminished duty of loyalty.
C. Option 3: Do Nothing
A third and less obvious way to respond to the diminishing
duty of loyalty is to accept the legal status quo and do nothing. This
is an option that should not be rejected outright. There are various
reasons why this might be appropriate. Most obviously, if each
individual development was worthwhile, then of course all of them
taken together may be appropriate, as well. It is also possible that,
although the status quo is imperfect, any identifiable fixes would
be more costly than beneficial. Alternatively, one might reasonably
believe that the controversial nature of the issue makes real reform
politically impossible. Change is by no means a foregone
conclusion.
The point of this Article has not been to insist otherwise.
Rather, it has been to point out an important fact that may not be
obvious: that the duty of loyalty has been consistently watered
down over the years to the point where it is but a shadow of its
former self. Standing alone, this fact would not necessarily be
problematic: laws often change, even drastically. What makes it
problematic is that the corporate law theory seems to depend upon
a robust duty of loyalty, and that the prevailing narrative assumes
that we have it. If the actual law does not match our understanding
of it, then something is definitely amiss.
This is why I have called for a reassessment of the legal status
quo. We should not assume that everything is fine as is, although
we cannot rule it out, either. After a thorough review, we may
decide that the status quo is roughly optimal after all. If so,
however, the disconnect between the theory and the practice
remains problematic. I submit that if no change to the law is going
to be made, then we still need to rethink corporate law theory and
revise the prevailing narrative. We ought not to perpetuate the
mistaken notion that the duty of loyalty is enforced strictly.
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Candor is essential to the proper development of the law. An
incorrect understanding is likely to hold back appropriate reforms,
whether in one direction or another.
I am of the opinion that things have gone somewhat too far.
However, I realize that it is reasonable to maintain that things
have not gone far enough. Policy debates of this kind are entirely
appropriate. But they should be open and honest, so that we can
be clear about what we are doing and why. If it is difficult to
maintain a narrative in which fiduciary duties are very weak, that
would be strong evidence that the law is suboptimal. But if a new
narrative can be developed and sustained, then perhaps we are on
the right track after all. In fact, such a narrative might help
corporate law theory and practice develop properly, rather than
being held back by antiquated notions of the importance of loyalty.
In any event, doing absolutely nothing about the diminishing duty
of loyalty is not a valid option.

